Back so soon? Australian troops patrolling in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.
It's easy to understand why Canberra worries about the island arc to Australia's north - Indonesia, New Guinea, and Melanesia. In 1942 the Japanese thrust deep into the Southwest Pacific, threatening to invade Australia from island bases. Allied victories at the Kokoda Trail, Guadalcanal and Midway averted the threat. But Australians remember the close call, and this is reflected in their approach to defence.
Australia's defence policy is based on several key principles:
- alliance with the United States, but stand alone if necessary;
- defence of the mainland, and domination of Australia's air/sea approaches;
- attacking hostile forces as far away as practicable.
To do this, Australia needs high-tech air and naval forces with a qualitative edge over regional forces. It must also exert strategic influence over the island arc, to prevent hostile powers establishing a presence. For Australia, the island arc is like a fighter's guard - get inside the guard and the fighter becomes unbalanced and exposed.
The problem for Canberra is that in recent times the arc has become unstable, with failed states, corrupt governments, violence, poverty and environmental degradation. Indonesia is struggling with Islamic extremism, and Melanesia is plagued by political and ethnic conflict. In the 1990s the phrase 'Arc of Instability' was coined. As Australian Labor leader Kevin Rudd recently commented, it has "gone from being a strategic concept a decade ago to an unsettling reality today".
Instability raises the prospect of rising regional powers, such as China, gaining footholds close to Australia. It is not difficult to imagine a failing state seeking financial assistance from Beijing, and providing basing rights in return. For Canberra, China's rise, and the perceived erosion of Australian influence in the Arc as Pacific states 'look north', are of growing concern.
There are more immediate worries. Canberra perceives that the Arc is becoming a haven for terrorists, drug traffickers, people smugglers and criminal financiers. These elements are attracted by growing lawlessness, corruption, and proximity to Australia. Conflict and economic collapse could trigger refugee waves, and require Australian intervention to evacuate nationals and provide humanitarian aid.
Nightmare scenarios include a fragmenting Indonesia, and the collapse of Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former Australian colony. With substantial security, economic and consular interests in PNG, Canberra would feel obliged to take control of the country. This would be an enormous drain on finances and manpower, and would expose Australian personnel to great risk.
Recognizing the high stakes involved, Canberra provides PNG with substantial financial support, and assists other governments with reforms. Since 1997 Australia has led a number of regional interventions in response to crises - notably East Timor and Solomon Islands.
There is currently a debate in Canberra about whether Australia should be more proactive in addressing the economic and social roots of instability - more 'fences at the top of the cliff'. Invariably, this would involve greater cost and intrusion into Pacific sovereignty. One thing is certain - Canberra sees a bleak future for the Arc of Instability, and is resigned to further intervention.
(This post is part of the Oceania series collaboration between Coming Anarchy, The Strategist, and Pacific Empire.)
