Who and Where are Today's Military Thinkers?

Quentin recently asked if there are people in western militaries who are "thinking outside the square" about strategy and warfare.

It's a good question and one that I don't have a ready answer for. Over the last 200 years there have been a number of great thinkers, like Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan, T E Lawrence (pictured), Basil Liddell Hart, J F C Fuller, and John Boyd. They developed general theories about war or thought deeply about the nature and shape of future warfare.

There were also military officers who operationalized radical ideas and thinking. They include Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian, the German pioneers of armoured warfare, along with Orde Wingate and David Stirling, the Brits who trail-blazed the use of special forces in WW2.

These thinkers thought deeply about their subjects. Their ideas were backed by experience, or they tested and refined their ideas in the field. They tended to be outsiders and were often regarded by the military establishment as odd, unorthodox, even dangerous. Some, like Fuller and Guderian, gravitated towards experimental military areas. To paraphrase Boyd, they tended to 'do something not be someone'. 

What about today? Who are the thinkers in western militaries? In the US, John Nagl comes to mind for his work on counterinsurgency. As Zenpundit and Armchair Generalist point out, Nagl recently left the army for a job with a think tank. The British have Sir Rupert Smith, who wrote The Utility of Force after he retired from the British forces.

Other than these people, I'm struggling. Any nominations? Or are we more likely to find today's military thinkers in universities and think tanks (e.g., Martin van Creveld and Willam Lind), in aid agencies and private military companies, in IT companies, or, heaven forbid, in the blogosphere?

Comments

[ortho]

What about David Kilcullen, an Australian counterinsurgency expert who advised Petreaus and Condoleezza Rice?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Kilcullen

[Peter]

Yes, excellent nomination Ortho. A real intellectual, but with a practical background as well.

[Younghusband]

I think this is a great observation. The thinkers out there today like Berkowitz, Lind and Gray are likely going to come from the think tank side of things for two reasons: 1) economics, and 2) military education.

The first reason has to do with training time. Today's soldier has a lot on his plate and does not have the time to dedicate to study sweeping issues of strategy, like an academic with a dedicated research budget and the freedom to "think." Our militaries are focussed on tactics. This feeds into the second reason: military education is seen as a means rather than an end in itself. It is simply a box to check off for promotion. This is a sorry state of affairs. I think a closer relationship with civvie institutions will not only help to better the caliber of military education, but will also legitimize military educations in the eyes of academia. War is no longer a battlefield issue, and exposure to a wider set ideas would benefit both milthinkers and civthinkers.

My two yen.

[Quentin]

Younghusband, Peter,

You are thoughtfully right-strategy in University is not taught widely. I hope to do a Strategy paper next semester and hope it will shed light on warfare a lot more. It makes or breaks civilization, East or West, North or South. The fates of human societies is precuriously balanced between political decision-making and war strategy. has all ways and will all ways be that way. (not 'always' as a word).

I now have a raft of names to study yippee!

[Smitten Eagle]

I see the problem of educating officers as more damning of the American psyche than anything.

Americans have a well-known penchant for eschewing professional credentials, favoring amateur dabblings. This is a general comment on the American character, and perhaps it descends from the Rugged Individualist pioneer of yore.

This eschewing of professional credentials manifests itself as a lack of willingness to openly discuss intellectual military topics: The second a good lieutenant starts discussing such topics with his peers, undoubtedly some Major who just came off a staff tour at PACOM will overhear the discussion and tell the young officers to "stay in their paygrade." (This scenario has happened to me on more than one occasion).

Furthermore, the idea of a professional is manifestly misunderstood. When "Professionalism" is referred to by officers, usually it is as a means of getting Marines to get haircuts, PMing equipment, writing fitreps well, being punctual, etc. Professionalism in today's military does NOT mean: professional study, debate of tactics and strategy, leadership, and military ethics.

I therefore submit that the dismal state of the modern military mind comes from an American lack of respect for professional credentials, as well as a misunderstanding of the definition of professionalism itself.

Without such an understanding of professionalism, the study of warfare becomes an obligation imposed from without, as opposed to an obligation imposed from within by self-discipline and by allegiance to our comrades and the nation.

[Phil]

Nagl, Petraeus and Kilcullen were my first thoughts. Of course, they are not really "outside the square" considering that they are rehashing/operationalizing time-honoured COIN strategies - not that that's a bad thing. I am surprised that retired USMC Col. TX Hammes has not been mentioned. You could find many more at the Small Wars Journal.

Of the people you've already mentioned, I expect van Creveld to have the most enduring influence.

Outside the militaries, Philip Bobbitt, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Robb etc all deserve a mention. Possibly Mary Kaldor. John P. Sullivan is in law enforcement, does that count? I could list dozens of unconventional strategic thinkers in the blogosphere...

[chris]

They aren't in the military. The best people that could help the military likely work at UPS, or on political campaigns, or at Amazon.com, or for ad agencies.

[zenpundit]

Great military thinkers are innovators and innovation means non-conformity. Non-conformity means breaking obsolete rules. That's not a quality that helps an officer make the jump from colonel to general officer, particularly in a peacetime army.

While militaries weed out those who cannot hack it, the gross incompetents and those caught with their hands in the cookie jar. they also cashier a lot of their most adaptive thinkers who persisted in thinking instead of saluting. Then they wonder why their gold-plated force cannot effectively tackle ethnic paramilitaries, terrorists and guerillas.

[Charles Cameron (hipbone)]

Making what is perhaps still Zenpundit's point in somewhat different terms:

New insight, theory and practice arise when (a) a new world is perceived with (b) fresh eyes -- ie when the situation has shifted enough for new configurations to be visible, and the mind that's looking has shifted enough to be able to perceive them. Boyd, for instance, was able to witness the mongoose / cobra dance in three dimensions, with a mind fresh enough to see it anew and thus contextualize and explain it in new terms.

But those new terms also require fresh ears to hear them -- though by the time someone can see the new patterns clearly enough to name them, there are generally others who are glimpsing enough to recognize them when described.

And then the dance begins, in which those with the old vision -- perhaps with notches on their belt because of it, symptoms of [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victory_disease] the "victory disease" -- spurn the new insights for a while. So that the minimum turning-circle of desperately needed ideas can last a generation...

[strategist]

Picking up on Smitten Eagle's comment, the British officer corps (regular army) used to be renowned for its anti-intellectualism - here I'm talking about pre-WW2. In any officers mess there was a prohibition on "talking shop", at least in cavalry, infantry and guards regiments, as it went against the creed of the gentleman amateur. I wonder if this is still a problem?

[Moon]

Concur with zen. Would add that non-conformity doesn't fit academia either, so you might omit academics from the list of (truly) great military thinkers. They don't truly have the freedom to think!

[strategist]

Thinking about YH's point:

"a closer relationship with civvie institutions will not only help to better the caliber of military education, but will also legitimize military educations in the eyes of academia."

The British naval strategist and historian Sir Julian Corbett, who wrote treatises on naval warfare in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, could serve as a model of a bridge between civilian and military. Corbett never served in the Royal Navy, but he was an influential member of the naval community, close to Jackie Fisher, served as an adviser to the Admiralty, and taught naval officers at staff colleges.

[deichmans]

Peter,

Excellent question. Based on my experience in the employ of the U.S. Dept of Defense, there are several thinkers to whom I attribute "grand thinking" that changed the rules of the game:

- VADM(ret) Art Cebrowski, USN (whose ability to think of security in the larger context of politics, economics and business were far more important than his development of the foundational ideas behind Network Centric Warfare).

- COL(ret) Douglas MacGregor, USA (a gifted wartime commander who had the daring to challenge the Army's core philosophies -- and continues to rankle the defenders of the dogma).

- LtGen(ret) Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (whose exploits in MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 only show the tip of the iceberg of this "warrior monk").

- Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (current HQ USAF Director of ISR, whose theories on nodal analysis created amazing efficiencies in the use of precision targeting -- it's too pat to dismiss him for his proponency of Effects Based Ops.)

- MAJ(ret) Don Vandergriff, USA (who has done more to effect positive change in military personnel practices than anyone I know.)

- Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England (a free thinker who has seen the need to better understand and conduct "stability operations" by defense professionals -- he was the driving force behind DoD Directive 3000.05, which is well worth a read.)

- Dr Tom Barnett (a protege of Cebrowski, Tom has done more for advancing the dialog on globalization and creating a lexicon that now permeates the international security establishment.)

As you can see, some of these are polar opposites in terms of their ideas. But one thing they have in common is the "betweenness" of their contributions to the collective body of thought on international security.

[Scott]

I agree with Tom Barnett being an influential thinker these days. Another historical figure I would suggest is Heinrici, who masterminded the defense of Berlin against the Soviets. He's not well known, but he was quite the defensive strategist and it took much longer for the Russians to win than they otherwise would have.

Scott

[Smitten Eagle]

Strategist-

I think there is an anti-intellectualism in much of the military. This can be an advantage, however, because it allows for eccentric people to advance.

Anti-intellectualism is dangerous, however, when it is combined with ossification--which I'll define as bureaucratic encroachment into personnel-related and operational matters. Examples of this would be concepts of "career path", "career management", etc... (Essentially that people are groomed for leadership by ticket-punching). No military man can be a true professional if he's just worried about that next promotion or screen board. So, yes, mil officers are often strapped for time, but it's not always because of operations--it's because of self-generated pressures.

Here are some solutions: Adopt a regimental personnel system (Hat tip: Vandergriff), do away with the three-years tours of duty in favor of a more fluid system, etc.

Here's a concept the military might want to consider: A sabbatical program for mid-grade officers.

[Galrahn]

I see three emerging influences in the US Navy worth observing.

Strategically - Dr. Tom Barnett's influence is becoming more apparent by the day, I could list several dozen examples in the last 18 months alone.

Tactically - Bob Work of CSBA, once a lone voice in the wilderness his ideas continue to emerge following the release of the Maritime Strategy.

Within the Navy keep your eye on Vice Admiral John G. Morgan. He is well ahead of the game in grasping the strategic and tactical ideas of our time and appears to be managing well the greatest challenge of them all. Change.

[Ares]

Though he doesn't have a body of work (aside from FM 3-24) I would submit Gen. James Mattis'(USMC)name for the list.

[strategist]

Thanks everyone for a great discussion. Over the weekend I'll write a post which will summarize the main points of this discussion, list the people that we've identified as thinkers, and make several observations.

One group of people who seem to be missing from the list are journalists. I think that Robert Kaplan's name should be added - I thought that some of his observations about the US military in Imperial Grunts were insightful and forward-looking.

[RPL]

Colonel H.R. McMaster of the US Army. His book "Dereliction of Duty" is a fascinating read. If he doesn't get his stars, it's a travesty.

[Peter]

Also came across Major General Vincent Desportes, a French army officer, and author of the recently published Tomorrow’s War – Thinking Otherwise - h/t Armchair Generalist. He argues that military transformation is largely irrelevant to future conflicts because these will be waged against irregular enemies in cities who seek to outflank the West's technical and industrial armoury.

This article introduces his ideas.

[Phil (Pacific Empire)]

There may be anti-intellectualism in the military, but equally, anti-military attitudes are prevalent in many universities. Academic disciplines such as strategic studies and military history are suffering as a result.

[strategist]

I agree Phil. Having done an MA in strategic studies, albeit a while back, I remember the funny looks I got from people when I told them what I was doing. IR seemed to be the "cool" and PC thing to do.

Likewise history - even someone like James Belich had to dress up his interest in military history as the history of race relations.

[exkiwiforces]

What about Ted Serong australia's first Counter Insurgency expert.
For 14 yrs he sounded warnings of what could be done in Veitnam and what should not be done, and for 14yrs he met the of Cassandra, the prophet of the Trojan war, doomed to tell what lay ahead but doomed to be disregarded until it was too late.
(text from the introduction) There to the bitter end. Ted Serong in Veitnam.

[Peter]

I've just read his obit in the Sydney Morning Herald (2002). What an amazing character.

[Adrian]

Steve Metz - long list of publications, also posts on Small Wars Journal and is a very nice guy. Writes very good stuff, certainly on a par with Rupert Smith (whose book I wasn't terribly impressed with).

[exkiwiforces]

There to the bitter end, Ted Serong in Vietnam by Anne Blair (ISBN 1 86508 468 9). The book is unreal and when i brought it back in 01 i couldn't put it back down once i started to read it and i wish i had the book for 5th Form History back in NZ.

Sir Paddy Ashdown's Book Swords to Ploughshares has been a good read so far. I bought this book for his refernce to East Timor during Interfet/UNTAET and post UN up to 06 as i have been to ET twice under Interfet and in 06. He also gets stuck into the Yanks for the cockups made they have made in Iraq before there surge effort which seems to be working for the time begin.

[Peter]

The more I've read about Serong today, the more I think what a fascinating individual he was. I was particularly interested in how he was an adviser to the Burmese government for two years in their counterinsurgency efforts. I didn't realize that the Australians were involved in this.

[exkiwiforces]

(My last got loss in the mail)

The Book on Ted Serong by Anne Blair is a bloody good read and as it in the introduction he was a Cassandra. I only wish i had this book for 5th form history back in NZ.

Sir Paddy Ashdown a ex Royal Marine (A real Marine), S.B.S, ex Lib Demo leader in the UK and he was the big boss in Bosnia during the rebuilding phase. His book Swords into Ploughshares is very good so far as i'm half way though it at moment. He gets stuck into the Yanks about there cockups in a Iraq before the surge.

[exkiwiforces]

Sorry about the my last post (23:19) i've a very long at work with kit checks and i've got problem child in my section he's giving me more headaches than bottle of Talisker scotch does.

That was something i didn't know either until started to read the book, but what really caught my eye was his time in Vietnam and how the yanks seem to not take his advice yet we were (Kiwi, Ozzies, and the Poms) using these same tactics that he was telling the yanks in S.E Asia and yet we did very well in the end.

[Xcroc]

Chris Bray is a knowledgeable historian, and his observations on military history and behavior don't just come out of his ass, he has read wide and thoroughly, writes well, and has served in the infantry. I don't think he has published any books, but I have followed things he has written online for over a decade.
He wrote a beautiful takedown of Victor Davis Hanson:
Torturing History - A military historian abuses the past.
http://www.reason.com/news/show/28368.html
And I think this is worth a look:
The Media and GI Joe - How the press gets the military wrong -- and why it matters.
http://www.reason.com/news/show/28311.html

He wrote for Suck back in the day, and those are still online here at Suck
Although some of these posts are dated in spots, most hold up well. Two particularly worth noting are
Them Against Fire
The Catcher in the Wheat
I always liked his treatment of Cheney in Chickenhawk Down, and about the effectiveness of bombing in Vietnam and pre 9/11 Iraq in Rolling Blunder. And Don't Tell, Don't Tell might followup on some of the comments here on what gets talked about and what gets trained.
He blogs here:
historiblogography

You may already know his work, in which case, forgive the length of this. But if you haven't read him, he is worth a look.

[Kotare]

Thanks Xcroc - I'll look at those links you've listed. Your comment has only just been published, because it got caught in Typepad's spam filter, which gets overzealous at times, and I've only just picked it up.

[Sven Ortmann]

The proposed people are conspiciously often Americans or British.
I'm sure there's some kind of Tuchachevsky at this time in the Russian army, small navies of the NATO have most likely some excellent thinkers (I have a feeling that it's worthwhile to search in Denmark).
Indian forces, Chinese forces as well as several insurgencies (do the Tamil Tigers have a mastermind?) certainly also have thinkers who are more noteworthy than the proposed list of U.S. military reformers.

I regret that some of the last doctrine stuff that I've seen from Germany (air mechanization assuming forces hovering over enemy terrain, NCW clones) was not worth the read.
Too detached from combat realities, too bureaucratic atmosphere.

I believe that those COIN specialists are not very helpful - the future will not be 'coined' by COIN campaigns.
We burn two fingers at once and will learn to stay out of the heat and not to incite unneeded fires (until we forget or ignore the lesson in another generation).

We should probably rather look for a modern Ludendorff. He emphasized the total war requirements in modern war and the all-round mobilization in the inter-war years.
Now we need somebody who emphasizes the same and especially the economic foundation.
Too many Europeans and North Americans consider their economic superiority as a law of nature and project this superiority in a future without good reasoning.

[Kotare]

That's an interesting thought, Sven. I think the same can be said for the way that people think that cheap oil will continue indefinitely into the future, despite growing indications to the contrary. I doubt that many militaries, let alone governments, have begin to grapple with the shape and equipping of militaries in an era of oil scarcity.

[Blackwell]

For my money, Colin S Gray is one of the finer writers on the subject, not least because he can show and praise a good idea, and then show further where the idea is ruined when taken too far. This is a crucial distinction IMHO.

[Kotare]

Thanks Blackwell. I enjoyed reading Gray's latest book (?) - Another Bloody Century, although I did think that he laboured the point about the continued relevance of Clausewitz to strategic thinking to death.