The Strategist

"We lead from the front..."

Chris Keeble, on the deaths of Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe, CO of 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and Trooper Joshua Hammond, in Helmand, Afghanistan:

“We lead from the front. The death of a commanding officer is no less and no more of a tragedy than the death of a private soldier.”

Keeble was second-in-command of 2 Para during the Falklands War in 1982. He took immediate control of the battalion when its CO, Lt Col "H" Jones VC was killed attacking an Argentinian machine gun at Goose Green.

Sunday reflection: on "The Accidental Guerrilla"

The navigator

I've got a rotten cold, so last night I went to bed early with a copy of David Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla. Several hours later I finally went to sleep, after finishing off the evening with some light reading - a skip through Frederick Forsyth's classic thriller The Odessa File.

Kilcullen's book is a study of modern guerrilla (or 'hybrid') warfare, and how to deal with it. It draws on Kilcullen's extensive practical and theoretical experience as an Australian army officer, counterinsurgency advisor to the US government, and conflict ethnographer (his doctorate from the University of New South Wales looked at the impact of guerrilla warfare on non-state political systems in traditional societies).

I'll fully review this book when I've finished it (see Zenpundit for another take on Kilcullen). But for now you may be interested in Kilcullen's reflection on the Iraq War. "The war," Kilcullen writes, "in grand-strategic terms, was a deeply misguided and counterproductive undertaking, an extremely severe strategic error, and a model of exactly how not to do business." He considers that the "Surge" of 2007, which focused on securing and splitting the Iraqi population from the insurgents, was a way of saving "ourselves from some of the more egregious consequences of a bad decision to invade Iraq in 2003".

This is one of the things I like about Kilcullen, and one of the things that's valuable about this book. Kilcullen is his own man, not afraid to call a spade a spade and make life uncomfortable for the elites.

By the way, the picture (another lunchtime shot) shows the Kupe group statue at Taranaki St Wharf, Wellington. The three figures are Kupe, the legendary Polynesian navigator, who's said to have discovered New Zealand, his wife Te Aparangi, and the tohunga (priest) Pekahourangi.

Staying low the most sensible approach

Here's another excellent video clip from Guardian correspondent John D McHugh in Kunar, Afghanistan. It looks at the fighting in Kunar largely from the perspectives of local village leaders.

You can't help but appreciate their predicament. The villagers want to get on with daily life, which is struggle enough, but are caught in a war, not of their making, between two sets of intruders: the US and the Kabul government on the one side and the Taliban on the other. For the villagers the most sensible approach is not allying with one or other side but, as best they can, trying to stay low and out of the way.

US Air Force scores own goal (again)

Here's what US Army Field Manuel No. 3-14 Counterinsurgency says about the use of air strikes:

"E-5.  An air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory.

Even when justified under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgents’ benefit."

Looks like someone forgot to send a copy to the US Air Force ... "US air strikes kill dozens of Afghan civilians".

The Gun of Doom

When I was a kid, I voraciously read war comics - fictional tales of derring-do, usually set in the Second World War, with fearless Allied soldiers fighting fanatical Nazis or Japanese and prevailing against great odds. The titles were evocative and stirring - "The Fighting Few", "Banzai! Banzai! Banzai!" and "The Haunted Jungle". The motifs were timeless and recurring - honour, courage, grit, self-sacrifice, redemption and so on. The plots were simple, the dialogue cheesy, and exclamation marks flew thick and fast...

"It's darned tough, sir! Once those Huns get across the river they'll be all over us like a swarm of hornets!"*

Now, almost straight from the Commando comic annals, comes this story from the Afghan War, with the blood-curdling headline "British two-ton 'Dragon gun' terrifies Taliban" (h/t Armchair Generalist). According to the Times, plucky British gunners, guarded by stalwart Gurkhas, haul a 105mm light gun up a mountain in Helmand province. When the gun opens fire it terrifies the Taliban, so much that they name it 'the Dragon', "because of the flame that belches out of its barrel when fired". 

Ye gods!

The obvious question is why the Brits didn't fly the gun of doom to the top of the rock outcrop? The article suggests that surprise was a key factor in the decision to do things the old fashioned way. But surprise would only last until the gun fired, then everyone would know its position.

The Times article is a straight cut and paste from this British Ministry of Defence release, and a good example of lazy churnalism. It's worth reading the MoD release, because it explains why the Brits sited the gun on top of the rock outcrop, e.g., being able to fire directly at the enemy in a straight line, rather than indirectly. The MoD release also undermines the element of surprise line that the Times article ran. According to the MoD, helicopters were used to ferry the gun to the foot of the cliffs, and the gunners spent the previous four days building a solid firing platform on top of the outcrop. So much for secrecy.

The epic story of the hauling of the gun of doom smells like a PR stunt. But am I being too cynical? Perhaps it's more likely that British officers on the ground wanted to give the poor gunners something to do, and some enterprising MoD PR hack saw this as a golden opportunity to spin a positive story about Brits in Afghanistan.

* 'Sergeant Dave Green', in "Fight Back to Dunkirk" (War Picture Library).

Training the Afghan National Army

One of the key objectives in Obama's Afghanistan/Pakistan strategy concerns the Afghan national security forces (army and police):

"Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced US assistance."

The White Paper proposes that the size and capability of the security forces must be "substantially increased", and that "salaries must become more competitive with those paid by the insurgents". 

You can get a sense of just how tough this task will be by watching two videos, especially this one. Guardian photo-journalist John McHugh shot the videos at a combat outpost in mountainous Kunar province, where US Marine trainers were working with a Afghan National Army unit. It's clear that the Afghan troops are not up for much, and that their opponents, the Taliban, are far better trained, paid, equipped, and motivated. As one of the Americans put it:

"when you look at the enemy, they have performance-based promotions where, if they do a good job, they get promoted [instead of] who they're related to, and you have to respect that..."

The American trainers seemed like a sharp bunch of guys - disciplined, intelligent, and having a good rapport with the Afghan soldiers. Quite different from this loudmouth in Iraq. But the trainers' inability to speak with the Afghan soldiers in their own language must be a huge obstacle to progress. If the US is to dispatch more military trainers to Afghanistan, giving those soldiers a working knowledge of Dari or Pashto should be a prerequisite. 

Obama announces new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

US President Barack Obama has announced a new integrated strategy for fighting terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The strategy is set out in a six page white paper. Here are the key goals:

• "Disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and...prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan".

• Promote effective and self-reliant government in Afghanistan and Pakistan, at all levels, with a significant jump in civilian assistance.

• Build up the strength and capacity of Afghan and Pakistani security forces to fight insurgents and provide security to local populations.

• Work with other countries and the United Nations to carry out these objectives.

Here are my observations about this strategy.

• The strategy sets clear objectives. Whether those objectives can realistically be achieved is another question, e.g., stabilizing two very unstable regions, and reversing a longstanding tradition of weak and corrupt central government, are big asks. Some objectives may undermine others, e.g., attacking the narcotics trade will alienate farmers from the Afghan authorities.

• Escalation is inherent in this strategy. By attacking al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan, the US is significantly widening the theatre of war and the number of troops and equipment needed. It risks creating more "accidental guerrillas" - locals who end up fighting with the terrorists because their valleys are invaded by foreign troops.

• The strategy includes some sound ideas, such as a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan (which prioritizes population security, economic development, and building effective local governance), and reconciling with moderate elements of the Taliban (something which I've long argued for - here, for instance). 

But the big question is whether the US and its allies can stay the course. This strategy is big, multi-faceted and ambitious, and needs substantial long-term commitment. Can the US sustain this commitment in the midst of a deepening global slump, and with a more immediate crisis - Mexico's collapse as a functioning state and its drug war - to deal with?

David Kilcullen on "accidental guerrillas"

I recommend this Danger Room interview with counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen. In the interview, Kilcullen outlines his idea of the "accidental guerrilla"...

Interviewer: When did the concept of the "accidental guerrilla syndrome" really start to click?

Kilcullen: It was field observation over ten years or so, but the name came to me one afternoon near the Khyber Pass... My local escort commander pointed out to me that he and his guys were the real foreigners on the Frontier, whereas the al-Qaeda guys had been embedded there for a generation. He said no outsider could tell the locals apart from the terrorists except by accident. And when outsiders intervene to deal with the global terrorists hiding out in areas like the FATA, it turns out people get upset, and the local community coalesces around rejecting outside interference, and closes ranks to support the terrorists....

This has happened in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, Thailand, Indonesia, Europe - basically everywhere I've worked since 9/11, I have observed some variation on this pattern. I call the local fighters "accidental guerrillas," because they end up fighting on behalf of extremists, not because they hate the west but because we just turned up in their valley with a Brigade, looking for AQ. And I calculate 90 to 95 percent of the people we've been fighting since 9/11 are accidentals, not radicals."

What does this tell us about the 'War on Terror'? That the war, and its campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, are mostly a sham. That the west has wasted a great deal of time, effort, lives and public money fighting people who mostly were not its enemies, at least not to begin with.    

It would be interesting to see if Kilcullen's "accidental guerrilla" concept also applies to the "War on Drugs". If American planes and agents spray or burn coca crops in remote Latin American valleys, does that simply drive local farmers into the arms of the drug lords?

Friday linkfest

• Things fall apart: Jeff Vail predicts the imminent collapse of Mexico (and "Pakistan perhaps, then Iraq, then Russia, then Italy, then China, then Indonesia etc").

• Gideon Rachman on the army food in Afghanistan. Think I'd prefer the Italian "gnocchi, washed down with an excellent Chianti" to the American fried chicken and six flavours of ice cream.

• Travels with Shiloh links to this Guardian article about "gold farmers" - poor Chinese kids who scratch a living by playing the shit parts of online games. As Dean puts it, "if you have players who’d prefer to pay people to play for them rather than play themselves it’s probably not a very good game".

Friday link-fest

• Rethinking Security on anarchists fighting cops with lasers.

• Armchair Generalist on one of my favourite questions - what the hell to do in Afghanistan?

• Global Guerrillas on why greedy bankers should be worried...really worried.

• The Capitol Tribune on Obama's speech to Congress, and the Republicans' lame response.

• Jamais Cascio's slideshow on imagining the future, with lots of cool photos (h/t YT).

If the Afghan war was a business, it would be broke

What's the cost of British military operations in Afghanistan this financial year? Nearly £2.6 billion (USD3.7bn), an annual increase of more than 50%. And what has the British government got to show for this "investment"? Bugger all.

If the Afghan operation was a business venture, it would be broke. Lot of investment but no profit, even after seven years in business.

I know it's difficult to compare private sector and government spending. Pay-offs for public spending - in health, education, public infrastructure and so on - take years, sometimes decades to show. For example, if you educate kids in IT skills the pay-off may not come until 20 years time, when they set up software companies that employ people and sell goods to other countries.

But what's scary about the British (and American) military spend in Afghanistan is that money is being spent even though the allies have had no realistic objectives, no strategy for achieving these, and no indicators for measuring progress. It's not surprising that one of the first questions President Obama asked his military chiefs was "what's the endgame?".

A new strategy for the Afghan war?

Canadian outpost, Ma'Sum Ghar, Afghanistan (photo: lafrancevi).

If you want to get a sense of the likely new counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, read this article by Nathaniel Fick and John Nagl and this interview with US General David Petraeus.

Petraeus is the head of the US Central Command. His beat includes Afghanistan. He wrote the "US Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual", and is credited with turning around the security situation in Iraq in 2007/08. Fick and Nagl are former US military officers, and counterinsurgency specialists who are closely associated with Petraeus and another noted expert, Australian David Kilcullen.

The articles suggest that coalition forces will seek to defeat the Taliban insurgency through these key elements:

• Provide security to the Afghan population, by having small troop and police detachments live among the people.

• Work with and through local governance structures, e.g., village councils.

• Develop rural infrastructure - roads, schools, electricity, clean water and so on.

• Strengthen the capacity and authority of the Afghan government, and its army, police and courts.

• Use minimum force, and limit air strikes (which have killed large numbers of civilians and have alienated the population).

• Negotiate and reconcile with elements of the Taliban.

The US is planning to "surge" an extra 30,000 troops to Afghanistan this year, while the British may send up to 3500 more soldiers. If the strategy outlined above is followed, many of these reinforcements will be deployed throughout countryside, in rural towns and villages, to provide security to the Afghan people, government administrators and development projects.

The bullshit files: John Hutton and the Nazi card

Playing the Nazi card is the weakest line of argument in university debating or online discussions. People who invoke Nazis or Hitler in arguments usually do so because:

• their argument is weak, and they're trying to disguise this; or

• they're losing the argument, badly; or

• they are trying to shut down debate; or

• they are incompetent and have no idea what they are doing.

In John Hutton's case, all four may apply. The British defence secretary claims that the Afghan war "is a struggle against fanatics that may not challenge our borders but challenges our way of life in the same way the Nazis did.”

There is simply no comparison between the threat posed to western democracy by Nazi Germany and its allies, and the terrorist activities of the Taleban and al-Qaeda. It's surprising that Hutton doesn't realize this, given that he is an Oxford graduate and a keen student of history.

In 1940/41, there was a real possibility that Nazi Germany would overrun Britain. If the Battle of Britain had been lost in 1940, or if Hitler had not invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, European democracy would have ended.

By contrast, today Al-Qaeda may be able to carry out sporadic terrorist attacks, or inspire others to do so, but the western way of life continues without significant disruption. In the 21st century, global recession, resource depletion, and climate change pose the real threats to "our way of life".

Chalk up another one for the bullshit files.

Sunday reflection

 

The Sunday flower: pelargoniums - also known as geraniums - are among my favourite flowering plants. They're easy to grow, flower in big clumps, and come in lots of varieties.

Last week I especially enjoyed the discussion about the way the US treats its staunchest ally in the Afghan war, Britain. This was blogging at its best - intelligent people debating interesting ideas in a civilized fashion.

I'm going to have another post up shortly about "Global Trends 2025" - definitely before Christmas day. I've gotta say that this report is heavy going - I'm reading chapter 5 and it's like wading through sludge.

Have a good week,

Kotare

We're Americans, we don't do tact and forbearance

Britain is the only reliable ally that America has in the Afghan war. So recent US criticism of the British army's fighting performance in Afghanistan seems, at best, misjudged, at worst, pretty stupid. I've had a hard day at work, so I'm going to settle for "pretty stupid".

When you're the leading nation in a coalition of allies, a certain amount of tact and forbearance goes with the territory. In the Second World War the British had coalition management down to a fine art. As well as keeping querulous Commonwealth governments (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, South Africa) onside, they had to manage delicate relations with powerful allies, the United States and Russia, plus a host of smaller allies, such as the Free French and the Polish.

Is it too much to suggest that Washington could take a similar tack in Afghanistan? Yeah, probably - Americans don't do tact and forbearance that well. And hey, maybe they want to go it alone in this aimless, endless and unpopular war?

The bullshit files: alms to the Taliban

A while back I wrote that the west is "fighting the Afghan war aimlessly and endlessly, without realistic objectives". If that isn't bad enough, it looks like the west is also paying protection money to Taliban commanders to make sure that supply convoys get safely from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Here's how it works...

"Contracts to supply British bases and those of other Western forces with fuel, supplies and equipment are held by multinational companies.

However, the business of moving supplies from the Pakistani port of Karachi to British, US and other military contingents in the country is largely subcontracted to local trucking companies. These must run the gauntlet of the increasingly dangerous roads south of Kabul in convoys protected by hired gunmen from Afghan security companies.

The Times has learnt that it is in the outsourcing of convoys that payoffs amounting to millions of pounds, including money from British taxpayers, are given to the Taleban."

So, the west is seeking to destroy the Taliban. The west is also propping up the Taliban. Yep, definitely one for the bullshit files.

Kilcullen - what's going wrong in Afghanistan

This is a great read (h/t Glamdring). Counterinsurgency guru David Kilcullen writes about the west's strategy in Afghanistan - what's right, what's wrong. Actually, mostly about what's wrong. Here's a snippet:

"Police are another main issue. We have built the Afghan police into a less well-armed, less well-trained version of the Army and launched them into operations against the insurgents. Meanwhile, nobody is doing the job of actual policing—rule of law, keeping the population safe from all comers (including friendly fire and coalition operations), providing justice and dispute resolution, and civil and criminal law enforcement.

As a consequence, the Taliban have stepped into this gap; they currently run thirteen law courts across the south, and ninety-five per cent of the work of these courts is civil law, property disputes, criminal matters, water and grazing disputes, inheritances etc.—basic governance things that the police and judiciary ought to be doing, but instead they’re out in the countryside chasing bad guys."

This seems to be part of a wider pattern: in counterinsurgencies, police forces get turned into paramilitary outfits. Is this because, as Kilcullen suggests, people confuse security with engaging the enemy in combat? Or is it a hangover from the British empire, where paramilitary policing was a key way of securing unstable frontier regions (Pakistan's Frontier Corps and India's Assam Rifles are modern day examples of this tradition).

Digging in for the long haul

Unless you're a member of Pakistan's ISI, this insight into the Taleban order of battle in Pakistan's Bajaur tribal agency may be of interest...

"The map tells a war story of its own. Sketched by a Taleban commander, it is of a stretch of territory fought over in Bajaur between the Pakistani Army and the insurgents. The ground has been neatly divided into specific areas of responsibility for different Taleban units.

Weapons caches, assembly areas and rendezvous points have been carefully marked and coded. This is not the work of a renegade gunman resistant to central authority; it is the assessment of a skilled and experienced fighter, and begins to explain how more than 400 Pakistani soldiers have been killed or wounded since August in Bajaur....

Discovered along with the map in a series of recently captured tunnel complexes are other documents - radio frequency lists, guerrilla warfare manuals, students' notes, jihadist propaganda and bombmaking instructions - that provide further evidence of the Taleban's organisation and training." 

For me, "tunnel complexes" are a red flashing light, a warning signal that the west, in its Afghan adventure, which threatens to spill into Pakistan's tribal agencies, is engaging a determined enemy who is psychologically preparing for the long haul.

Pakistan army does heavy lifting

You often hear this. The US, Britain and Nato allies take on the Taleban in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan stands by idly, allowing the insurgents safe haven in the tribal agencies, or worse, aiding and abetting them.

This Times article, by Anthony Lloyd, tells a different story - Pakistan army and Frontier Corps units engaged in bloody ground fighting against a well-armed and determined enemy in the Bajaur tribal agency:

"Initially given the job of pushing up from Khar and recapturing Loesam, they immediately found themselves in pitched combat against a well-armed enemy equipped with mortars, rockets, heavy machine guns and satellite communications systems. Extensive tunnel complexes, piled with rations and munitions, linked a series of defensive positions....

The Army's push was slow and bloody as the insurgents kept melting away and reappearing to ambush and harry the advance." 

Is Afghanistan an "important and strategic country"?

In this article on the state of affairs in Afghanistan, Alastair Leithead describes Afghanistan as "an important and strategic country wedged between Iran and an increasingly chaotic Pakistan".

I don't want to pick holes in what is otherwise a useful piece of analysis. But this line - Afghanistan is "an important and strategic country" - is often bandied about, without a shred of compelling argument to back it up. I don't think I'm being flip to suggest that Alexander and his Macedonian generals and Britain's Viceroys probably made similar claims.

The west is fighting the Afghan war aimlessly and endlessly, without realistic objectives. And just because Afghanistan is sandwiched between Iran and Pakistan doesn't ipso facto make it a strategic location. But perhaps I'm missing something here. I'd be very interested to hear what readers think about this question. Is Afghanistan an important and strategic country for the west? If yes, how?

Nato's lifeline runs through bandit country

While reading this article in Foreign Affairs, I came across an astonishing figure: 84 per cent of the material for US forces operating in Afghanistan goes through Pakistan.

Let me repeat that. 84 per cent of supplies for US forces fighting the Taliban transits a fractured country which is gripped by an Islamic fundamentalist insurrection, and where the power-brokers - the army and military intelligence - are trying to play off the US and its allies against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

No wonder, then, that the Taliban are trying hard to cut Nato's main supply line lifeline.

"Armies were like plants..."

Syed Saleem Shahzad writes about the Taliban's strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan:

"The real strategy was applied elsewhere in the Afghan province of Nangarhar and the Pakistani tribal area of Khyber, which are part of the transit route for 80% of Nato supplies. In February, Nato convoys were targeted in well-organised attacks, so successful and effective that Nato was compelled to sign a deal with Russia on 4 April on land transit for non-military freight through Russian territory. But such a route risked putting the budget of the western forces under serious strain.

According to an anonymous senior member of the Taliban, 'cutting off Nato’s supply line from Pakistan is an important element in our strategy. If it is correctly implemented in 2008, Nato will have to leave Afghanistan in 2009, although we might need an extra year.'"

This reminds me of what T E Lawrence wrote in Seven Pillars of Wisdom: "Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head".

In an era of global air transportation, we forget the extent to which armies still depend on long land and sea lines of communications for essential supplies - food, water, oil, ammunition and so on. These are vulnerable to interdiction by well-organized guerrilla and hybrid forces.

The Taliban are hard, we are soft

The story of British paratrooper Corporal Mark Wright, who died while leading the rescue of a comrade in Afghanistan, is one of great heroism. It also illustrates how defeating the Taliban is mission impossible.

In late 2006, Wright went to the aid of another soldier trapped in a minefield. He was mortally wounded when a rescue helicopter accidentally triggered land mines. Now a British coroner found that serious systemic failures contributed to Wright's death, including a lack of British helicopters in Afghanistan fitted with winches. According to the coroner, the lack of equipment was "simply about money".

What makes the Afghan war unwinnable is not penny-pinching bureaucrats. It is that western forces are obsessed with avoiding casualties, while the Taliban are not. The Taliban are hard, we are soft.

If a western soldier is trapped in a minefield, his comrades go to great lengths to save him. This risks the lives of many other men and women, and costs a lot of money. Our soldiers do so because they come from a society which places great stock on preserving the life of an individual. Death is hard to take, even for professional soldiers.

If the soldier dies, an inquest is conducted, a verdict is handed down, blame is laid, and people are fired. In the process, fresh doubts are raised about the effectiveness of the armed forces, the competence of its leadership, and the validity of the mission in Afghanistan. The demands for withdrawal grow louder and louder.

If a Taliban fighter is trapped in a minefield, his comrades shoot him and move on. There is no cost, no inquest, no blame, and no doubts. The Taliban fighters do this because they come from Pashtun tribal societies where toil, disease, conflict and death are unremarkable, part of everyday life.

It doesn't matter how many reinforcements and rescue helicopters with winches are sent to Afghanistan. In ground combat, the mental hardness and endurance of the Pashtun fighters will ultimately win out.

In Pharaoh's service

Ghaith Abdul-Ahad writes about the army of migrant labourers - from India, Pakistan and Afghanistan - who build Dubai's shining towers, and about how Dubai's elite view these destitute and oppressed men.

"We need slaves," my friend says. 'We need slaves to build monuments. Look who built the pyramids - they were slaves."

What's the bet that the camps where these helots are housed are incubating new recruits for the global jihad?

Photojournalist on the frontline

Embedded with US forces in Afghanistan, John McHugh is one of the best journalists reporting on the Afghan war. Check out this video to see why.

McHugh uses text, photos, film, audio to great effect. In this slideshow, he mixes black and white photos and audio - no voice-over, just the sounds of helicopters, gunfire and men talking - to capture something of the atmosphere during a Taliban attack on a US mountain outpost.

Outflanking the Taliban

The Times: "British and other Nato troops in Afghanistan were given a new mandate today to target and attack heroin drug barons and to destroy opium-processing laboratories....The focus will also be on drug producers with specific links to the Taleban to try and stop the estimated annual $80 million...being channelled from opium sales into the coffers of the insurgents."

Attacking the Taliban's finances is a smart 'indirect' move. As Clausewitz wrote in On War, there are many ways to reach one's object in war; in a counterinsurgency cutting the enemy's funds complements an assault on his fighting force.

There are a couple of problems though. The plan involves yet another mission for overstretched troops. It risks diverting resources from the fight against the Taliban and from rural reconstruction activities.

And while NATO will target drug producers, this will hurt Afghan farmers who grow the opium poppies. The authorities need to hold the allegiance of the rural population if the insurgency is to be contained. An assault against the drug lords should be accompanied by moves to legitimize the poppy crop and license production for painkillers (like morphine and codeine).

This would tie the fortunes of Afghanistan's rural population to those of the Kabul government, not to the Taliban and its drug lord allies.

Has the west been fighting the wrong war?

Times defence editor Michael Evans wonders if US General David Petraeus, the new CENTCOM commander, can win the Afghanistan war by applying his Iraq counterinsurgency experience.

A better question is whether, since October 2001, when the west invaded Afghanistan, we have been fighting the wrong war.

Just after 9/11 it was clear who the enemy was: al-Qaeda. Then things got hazy. The west invaded Afghanistan, and found itself fighting the Taliban. The US invaded Iraq, overthrew a regime which had no real connection with al-Qaeda, and found itself embroiled in a protracted insurgency.

The upshot? Seven years after 9/11, the west has fought two costly wars that it didn't have to, against people that weren't really its enemies.

In the last two years the fighting in Afghanistan has intensified, the security situation has deteriorated, and the conflict shows every sign of spilling into Pakistan's frontier provinces. It's not far-fetched to say that soon we will see the US routinely attacking Taliban inside Pakistan.

Petraeus may be able to contain the conflict, and, as British Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith suggested, reduce it to "to a manageable level of insurgency [that]...can be managed by the Afghan army". This will take several years at least.

But for what purpose? It's hard to see what strategic benefits the west will gain by intensifying the counterinsurgency. The only benefit that I can see is a short term tactical one: gain a temporary military ascendancy, thereby creating a position of relative strength from which to negotiate a political settlement with the Taliban.

Secret dealings with the Taliban

Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith, British senior commander in southern Afghanistan, had this to say about negotiating with the Taliban:

“We want to change the nature of the debate from one where disputes are settled through the barrel of the gun to one where it is done through negotiations.

If the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then that’s precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this. That shouldn’t make people uncomfortable.”

Last Sunday Jason Burke revealed that the Afghan government and Taliban senior leaders have been holding secret peace negotiations. The talks are sponsored by Saudi Arabia and supported by Britain. He suggests why the Taliban leaders may be willing to talk:

"'They've been fighting for nearly seven years, living undercover, moving regularly, unable to go back to Afghanistan without risking a violent death. Despite the bellicose rhetoric and the successes of recent months, they have lost a lot of people and there is a certain degree of fatigue,' said one experienced Pakistan-based observer."

This news will be anathema to the "never negotiate with terrorists" brigade - the armchair warriors who believe that anything less than crushing victory is a "white flag of surrender", and that counterinsurgencies can be won solely through military means.

But really, what choice does the West have but to seek a political settlement? The Taliban can draw on a deep reserve of religious zealots from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and foreign fighters from elsewhere in the Muslim world. Unlike western soldiers, these men have no trouble understanding why they are fighting, and no problem dying for the cause. This war could go on indefinitely.

As I've written before, great generals and statesmen have routinely used negotiation as a way of ending war. Given that the Afghanistan fighting seems to have become stalemated, with both sides copping heavy punishment and fatigue setting in, now seems like a good time to talk.

Smitten Eagle on "How not to win a war"

In my last "Raiders of the Lost Archives" post, I discussed coalition air strikes in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

Smitten Eagle, who served with the US Marines in Afghanistan, had this to say in response:

"I think the use of air strikes and arty [artillery] is more of a function of techno-fetishism. Each year PGMs [precision-guided munitions], guidance technology, and effects-prediction models seem to improve, giving false hope to the futile idea that a pilot has better situational awareness than people on the ground.

We would be better served if we had less faith in the power of technology, especially with regard to the forms of People's War..."

Raiders of the Lost Archives: "How not to win a war"

Each week I ransack the lost archives of The Strategist, to recall what I posted a year ago to the day (or thereabouts).

On 12 July 2007 I wrote about coalition air strikes in Afghanistan which killed a large number of civilians. "In a counterinsurgency," I commented, "the basic idea is to win civilians to your side, not drive them into the enemy's camp by killing their family and friends with air strikes and artillery fire. Why is it that some soldiers find this difficult to grasp?".

A year later, and déjà vu...

"A US air strike killed 47 civilians, including 39 women and children, as they were travelling to a wedding in Afghanistan, an official inquiry found today. The bride was among the dead. Another nine people were wounded in Sunday's attack....The US military initially denied any civilians had been killed."

COIN: Theory vs Practice

In this compelling video, photojournalist John D McHugh juxtaposes the theory of the US Counterinsurgency Field Manual with the way it is practiced by US soldiers fighting in Afghanistan:

"[General] Petraus says America now expects its soldiers to be nation builders as well as warriors. But is too much being asked of them? This is, after all, still a war.

I spent nearly two months with the men of Charlie Company. They are all fine soldiers doing their best. They made me laugh, they protected me in times of danger. But are they natural diplomats or nation builders?"

It's a good point. In The Civil War (I.71), Caesar wrote that "a good commander should be able to gain as much by policy as by the sword". But Roman commanders were first and foremost political leaders. There was little distinction between civil and military spheres - as is customary now - and oratory, diplomacy and negotiating came naturally to someone like Caesar.

Western commanders are first and foremost soldiers who may, during their careers, gain some of the skills of the politician. But this is pretty hit and miss. Is there a place, in counterinsurgency, for much greater use of political officers - civilians with expertise in civil administration, policing, and intercultural negotiation - to advise and represent field commanders in political dealings? Or going further, a role for a new type of civil organization that deals with nation building and frontier diplomacy, freeing the military to fight the enemy?

Weekend Reading: Ghosts of Alexander

I've been reading this fascinating post at Ghosts of Alexander on Russia's use of social scientists to inform war fighting and strategy in Turkestan, during the 19th century, and Chechnya, in the late 1990s.

The post mentions the US Army's Human Terrain System. This programme uses social scientists to advise military commanders about local customs in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Ghosts of Alexander considers that the programme is "a mere shadow" of Russian and British colonial inquiries.

A World Cup of Peace

In the 2006 Football World Cup, Germany, France, Italy and Portugal reached the semi-finals, with Italy narrowly beating France 5-3 in a penalty shoot-out to clinch the cup.

But what if the World Cup was about peace, not football? Then New Zealand and the Scandanavian countries would have semi-final berths, with Iceland pipping Denmark to win. According to the Global Peace Index, the world's most peaceful places in 2008 are:

1. Iceland
2. Denmark
3. Norway
4. New Zealand

No prizes for guessing that Iraq gets the wooden spoon.

Afghanistan Diary - "This seriously pissed us all off"

Remember Cpl Lachlan MacNeil of the British army's Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders?

"We'll give the Taliban a harder time than they'll give us. I'm really positive of that. I don't think they've fought Jocks yet either."

In this article, MacNeil relates his unit's first experience of fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, alongside US Marines. His writing is spare, down-to-earth, and at times funny:

"Moments later, an enemy anti-aircraft gun in the area showed itself. This was an immediate threat to us as aircraft were constantly flying overhead....I instructed our Javelin, a portable anti-tank missile system, to engage that target.

Initially we thought the Javelin's missile had missed or locked on to another source as it headed east behind a tree line. This seriously pissed us all off as there were a lot of coalition helicopters in the area and we didn't want the missile engaging one of ours. However, the message filtered through later on that evening that we had destroyed the Taliban anti-aircraft gun and vehicle, which was great news for us and especially for Lance Corporal Storrie, who was taking a serious hounding when we thought we had missed."

After my earlier post, Fabius and I debated whether MacNeil's Afghanistan diary has the makings of classic war literature (my view), or if it's simply "instant oral history" (Fabius's view). Whatever the answer, this initiative of the Guardian, turning soldier into reporter, gives a gripping ground eye view of the Afghan fighting.

Declan Walsh Dispatch

I've been reading Declan Walsh's Afghanistan and Pakistan reporting for some time. In his latest dispatch (audio-visual clip and accompanying article), Walsh reports from Gamsar, in southern Afghanistan, where Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and US Marines have been battling the Taliban.

"The fighters that pass before the British doorstep are as diverse as the Taliban has become. There are hard-bitten ideologues from the original Taliban movement of the 1990s, hired local fighters known as '$10 Taliban', Baluch drug smugglers and al-Qaida- linked Arabs.

But most, Afghan and British officials say, are Pakistani - ideologically driven young men who consider the war as a religious obligation of struggle, or jihad....

Up to 60% of the fighters in Garmser are Pakistani....They come from militant hotspots such as Waziristan and Swat, but also from Punjab, a rich agricultural province with a history of producing radical Islamists."

Afghanistan Diary

"We'll give the Taliban a harder time than they'll give us. I'm really positive of that. I don't think they've fought Jocks yet either."

The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (5 Scots) are deploying to Helmand province, Afghanistan, as part of the British 16 Air Assault Brigade.  Over the next six months, Corporal Lachlan MacNeil will keep a multimedia diary for The Guardian about his section's experiences.

The first installment shows the soldiers training in a mock Afghan village. MacNeil and his men talk about themselves - why they joined the army, what they expect to find in Afghanistan - in thick Scots accents, so thick that it's hard, at times, to pick up what they're saying.

This has the makings of classic war literature. Unlike the experiences of the 'Lost Generation' of the Great War, which were largely recorded by literary men of the officer class - like Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves, and Edmund Blunden - MacNeil's diary could provide an unvarnished and first-hand account of the war experience of privates and corporals.

Kings of Kafiristan

During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the mountains of Nuristan saw heavy fighting between Afghan guerrillas and Soviet soldiers. In the 19th century, the region was known as Kafiristan, a wild land beyond the frontiers of the Raj (the British empire in India), whose inhabitants were thought to descend from Macedonian soldiers left behind by Alexander the Great.

Rudyard Kipling used Kafiristan as the setting for one of his short stories: 'The Man Who Would Be King'. In the story, Daniel Dravot and Peachey Carnehan, two old India hands, strike out for the Hindu Kush and set themselves up as gods and kings of Kafiristan:

'One morning I heard the devil's own noise of drums and horns, and Dan Dravot marches down the valley with his Army and a tail of hundreds of men, and, which was the most amazing, a great gold crown on his head. "My Gord, Carnehan," says Daniel, "this is a tremenjus business, and we've got the whole country as far as it's worth having. I am the son of Alexander by Queen Semiramis, and you're my younger brother and a god too!"

Apaches in Afghanistan

This video shows a Dutch Apache gunship attacking Taliban insurgents by night in southern Afghanistan (h/t The Interpreter). The Dutch pilots work calmly and closely with US infantry, switching effortlessly between Dutch and English.

Air power has come a long way since the days of 'Bomber' Harris and the thousand bomber raids over Europe during World War Two.

Heavy Infantry

Hey, lay off those hamburgers!

A German parliamentary report into the physical fitness of German soldiers has found that they are fatter than the average citizen. 40 per cent are overweight, compared with 35 per cent of civilians of the same age, while - get this - over eight percent are obese.

If this soldier in Afghanistan is a yardstick, the last thing that NATO needs is more German soldiers in the hot areas of the south.

(Photo: Syed Jan Sabawoon/EPA)

Spreading the Word

Here's three posts that I've enjoyed reading recently.

Crossed Crocodiles writes here about the operations of private military companies (mercenaries) in Africa and their links with the US's AFRICOM command. (By the way, AFRICOM now has its own 'blog', but like Evolution of Security, which I wrote about here, it largely appears to be a PR bullshit exercise.)

The Yorkshire Ranter is skeptical about American efforts to persuade European NATO countries to dispatch troops to fight in Afghanistan. He also observes that the British are trying to set up something like the Firqat irregular units used in Dhofar (Oman) in the 1970s.

Curzon at Coming Anarchy has been mapping the waxing and waning of Persia, from the Achaemenid Empire in 500 BC to the modern day. This is the latest post in a Coming Anarchy series that has also covered Ethiopia, Poland and Armenia.

Deforestation in Afghanistan

Afghanistanica has an excellent post on deforestation and timber smuggling in eastern Afghanistan:

"It is possibly that the worst of the timber smuggling has ceased due to a combination of (a) shortage of easily accessible trees for the harvesters plus (b) American and Afghan government enforcement. But even presuming that is a fact, there still occurs deforestation due to overgrazing, local use of lumber and the burning of firewood. More problems within a problem within Afghanistan."

The Khyber Rifles March Again

In a throwback to the days of the Raj, the US is planning to train and equip Pakistan's Frontier Corps and tribal militias in the North-West Frontier Province. The idea is to use these forces to take the fight to al-Qaeda and Taliban groups, who have found safe haven in the anarchic tribal agencies, which border Afghanistan.

I want to focus on the Frontier Corps element of this proposal because, unlike John Robb, author of Brave New War, I consider that this idea has something going for it. In this post at Global Guerrillas, John argues that the Frontier Corps is "the wrong militia". He considers that "this militia is too tightly connected to the government and has a record of atrocity that makes it unlikely to generate any meaningful form of local loyalty".

Legitimizing the Poppy Crop

In Northern Ireland the British army learned that successful counterinsurgency operations have a strong indirect element, e.g., manoeuvring to cut off a gunman's escape route, or attacking terrorist finances.

Recently, the European Union assembly voted to ask member nations if a programme could be established to turn Afghanistan's poppy crop into painkillers (morphine and codeine). At present the opium is made into heroin and sold on streets in the west. Many Afghan farmers and their families depend on the poppy crop for their livelihood. The crop is also a major source of funding for the Taliban, which is fighting Afghan and NATO forces.

This is an idea that has a lot going for it. Legitimizing the poppy crop, and licensing production for painkillers, would cut a vital source of financing for the Taliban. It would tie the fortunes of Afghanistan's rural population to those of the Kabul government and NATO forces, particularly if farmers were paid fair returns for their crops. This is critical in the south, where the insurgency is fierce and opium production is rampant.

It beats hands down the alternative approach - spraying poppy crops with herbicide, which is advocated by the US, but resisted by Kabul. Such a move would pollute the environment, deprive poor farmers of their livelihoods, and drive them into the arms of the Taliban.   

(H/T Glamdring.)

Rise of the Warlord States

The Observer's Jason Burke reports on the emergence of a "wild and lawless new state" in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

"senior [NATO] officers admit privately that there is a danger that the south and east of Afghanistan...will effectively translate 'de facto autonomy' into independence. That raises the spectre of the confederation of warlord states that is in the process of emerging on the Pakistani side of the border effectively trebling in size with the addition of the Taliban-controlled zones in Afghanistan."

Plan to Split the Taliban

This, from the Guardian, sounds interesting...

"UK backs plan to split Taliban from within

The British government has thrown its backing behind an ambitious Afghan strategy to split the Taliban by securing the defection of senior members...and large numbers of their supporters. The strategy...reflects a significant shift in British policy, and is showing initial signs of success.

Following a wide-ranging policy review accompanying Gordon Brown's arrival in Downing Street, a decision was taken to put a much greater focus on courting "moderate" Taliban leaders as well as "tier two" footsoldiers, who fight more for money and out of a sense of tribal obligation than for the Taliban's ideology."

It is similar to what I suggested in 'Negotiating with the Taliban', back in April:

"...negotiations with Taliban factions at the provincial level...could be productive. These should not be piecemeal, but part of an overall strategy involving NATO and the Afghan government. The aim would be to split moderate factions from the Taliban as a whole.

In due course, a number of negotiated agreements, together with strengthened Afghan political processes, and a steadily improving security situation, could provide a conducive environment for high-level negotiations with the Taliban (or at least with moderate leaders) leading ultimately to an overall political settlement."

I also wrote - in 'Negotiating: A Neglected Element of Counterinsurgency' - about the value of negotiating:

"How could a commander use negotiators? Here are some ideas:

• In day-to-day dealings with the leaders of the population: village elders, tribal leaders, and local politicians. These individuals, and the people they represent, are not the enemy, but if they are not engaged in meaningful dialogue and a political process, they will at best remain neutral towards you, at worst give succour to your enemy. 

• To play for time. This gives you breathing room in which to further stabilize the security situation, and to assist the civil authority establish a legitimate political process, basic infrastructure, economic activity, and effective governance structures.

• To negotiate with adversaries of your enemy (on the principle that my enemy's enemy is my friend). Negotiating an alliance with such parties, or temporary assistance on particular matters, can strengthen your security position, and distract the enemy at unexpected times and from different angles.

• To negotiate with factions of the enemy, with the aim of detaching those factions away from the main body, and reaching separate settlements. This can promote infighting within the enemy's ranks, improve the local security situation, and weaken the enemy overall. Even the hint of a negotiation could promote discord within the enemy's ranks."

Talking with the enemy is not a sign of weakness. Used judiciously, and in the right circumstances, negotiating is a very useful multi-purpose tool. It goes to one of Sun-tzu's great ideas: "The warrior shapes his victory from the dynamic of the enemy".

How Not To Win a War (Part 2)

Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

I recently wrote about American air strikes in Helmand, Afghanistan, that killed large numbers of civilians. I commented that in "a counterinsurgency the basic idea is to win civilians to your side, not drive them into the enemy's camp by killing their family and friends with air strikes and artillery fire". I asked the question - "why is it that some soldiers find this hard to grasp?".

The following quote, sourced from this New York Times article, doesn't exactly answer that question. But it gives an insight into the US military's evasive attitude when dealing with such matters.

"An American military spokesman said United States Special Forces would continue to operate in Helmand for the foreseeable future. He denied that their tactics had caused greater civilian deaths and blamed the Taliban for fighting from civilian compounds."

This is one step short of blaming the victims.

In a counterinsurgency, winning the support of the civilian population is not an 'optional extra'. It's not a nice 'feel good' thing to do if you have the time. It is the crux of the matter, a strategic and tactical imperative that means the difference between success and failure. To quote Sun Tzu, it is "a matter to be pondered carefully".

(Map: New York Times.)

Victoria Cross Conferred on New Zealand Soldier

The Victoria Cross was conferred on Corporal Willy Apiata, NZSAS, at Government House this morning. Corporal Apiata VC said: "I feel very honoured and proud to wear this for my country".

(Photo: Phil Reid/Dominion Post.)

How Not to Win a War

"Aaarrgghh!!!". That's what I thought when I read this Afghanistan report by Jason Burke.

"In the latest of a series of attacks causing significant civilian casualties in recent weeks, more than 200 [civilians] were killed by coalition troops in Afghanistan in June, far more than are believed to have been killed by Taliban militants."

In a counterinsurgency the basic idea is to win civilians to your side, not drive them into the enemy's camp by killing their family and friends with air strikes and artillery fire. Why is it that some soldiers find this hard to grasp?

New Zealander wins VC for Afghanistan action

Corporal Bill Apiata, NZ Special Air Service, has been awarded the Victoria Cross, New Zealand's highest bravery award, for his actions in Afghanistan. When praised for his heroism Cpl Apiata said: "I was only doing my job".

Three of his comrades were also decorated for bravery, two with the Gallantry Star (the second highest decoration) and one with the Gallantry Medal (the third highest).

The award concerns Cpl Apiata's actions against al-Qaeda fighters in 2004. During the engagement, Cpl Apiata carried a wounded comrade to safety under intense enemy fire, then participated in a fierce counter-attack.

The citation reads in part:

"...Apiata concluded that his comrade urgently required medical attention, or he would likely die. Pinned down by the enemy, in the direct line of fire between friend and foe, he also judged that there was almost no chance of such help reaching their position.

As the enemy pressed its attack towards Apiata's position, and without thought of abandoning his colleague to save himself, he took a decision in the highest order of personal courage under fire. Knowing the risks involved in moving to open ground, Apiata decided to carry Corporal D singlehandedly to the relative safety of the main Troop position, which afforded better cover and where medical treatment could be given.

...Apiata stood up and lifted his comrade bodily. He then carried him across the seventy metres of broken, rocky and fire swept ground, fully exposed in the glare of battle to heavy enemy fire and into the face of returning fire from the main Troop position. That neither he nor his colleague were hit is scarcely possible. Having delivered his wounded companion to relative shelter with the remainder of the patrol, Apiata re-armed himself and rejoined the fight in counter-attack.

The Troop could now concentrate entirely on prevailing in the battle itself. After an engagement lasting approximately twenty minutes, the assault was broken up and the numerically superior attackers were routed with significant casualties, with the Troop in pursuit."

Cpl Apiata joins an illustrious list of New Zealand VC winners from the New Zealand Wars, the Boer War, the Great War, and World War Two. They include Charles Upham, who won the Victoria Cross twice in WW2, Lloyd Trigg, whose plane destroyed a German U-boat, and Moananui-a-Kiwa Ngarimu, the first Maori soldier to win the VC (Apiata, of Nga Puhi, is the second).

The SAS is an elite unit of the NZ army. It specializes in counter-terrorism and long-range reconnaissance. Formed in the 1950s, the unit fought in the Malayan Emergency, the Borneo Confrontation, the Vietnam War, and more recently in East Timor and Afghanistan. Earlier New Zealand special forces units included the NZ Squadron of the Long Range Desert Group (WW2), which operated behind German lines in the North African desert, and the Forest Rangers and the Colonial Defence Cavalry, units of frontiersmen who fought in the New Zealand Wars of the 19th century.

A Question of Legitimacy

Rory Stewart is a former British army officer and diplomat who works in Afghanistan. In this article by Patrick Smucker (h/t Tomorrow, what?), Stewart makes the following observation about the NATO-led counterinsurgency.

"We have a very difficult series of choices to make in Afghanistan. We have to acknowledge that we do not have the commitment, the will, the forces, the [political] intelligence or the understanding to fight a 20-year counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. For that, you would need to exert control over the local government. It worked very well for the British in British Malaya. But that was a colonial government."

The Malayan emergency (1948-60) is widely regarded as a model counterinsurgency. In Malaya, a crucial precondition for success was government legitimacy. The British colonial administration was seen by most Malayans, for better or worse, as the legitimate authority. Its standing was strengthened when it promised independence. Fighting in the jungle, the Chinese communist guerrillas were unable to wrest legitimacy from the British authorities.

Not all counterinsurgents enjoy this advantage. At best, legitimacy is contested between the government and the insurgents, as in Afghanistan among the Pashtun population. At worst, the counterinsurgent lacks legitimacy among the populace, and faces the daunting task of establishing this condition in the midst of waging a war.

This, I believe, is a key explanation for Coalition difficulties in Iraq. Many Iraqis consider that the Americans and the British are invaders who came to steal Iraqi land, oil and independence - they have no legitimacy. The difficulty is compounded because the Coalition and Iraqi forces have been unable to achieve two further conditions for success: working infrastructure (water, sewerage, electricity etc); and basic security for ordinary people against terrorist and sectarian attacks.