The Strategist

Rising temperatures - what impact on armed conflict?

This study (h/t Crikey Creek) looks at the likely impact that rising temperatures, caused by climate change, will have on armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa...

"this historical response to temperature suggests a roughly 54% increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030, or an additional 393,000 battle deaths if future wars are as deadly as recent wars."

Interesting, but what's the point? The study would be more useful if it examined the impact of rising temperatures on urban crime and violence in New York, London, Tokyo and Shanghai. Or if it looked at how reduced rainfall will affect water availability and relations between farmers and communities in the agricultural regions of the west and China.

In these places, loads of people think that climate change won't affect them. Only poor sods in far-off Chad, Ethiopia and Bangladesh should be worried about climate change, right? People don't realize that climate change is a problem for everyone, and so no-one demands that politicians cut carbon emissions to safeguard their future homes, livelihoods, food supplies and security. This lets politicians off the hook, and so they continue to do nothing.

The Zulu army - which Cohort of War?

Zulus annihilating the British at the Battle of Isandlwana, 1879 (painting: C E Fripp).

Which Cohort of War does the Zulu army of the 19th century belong to? At first glance, it looks like a typical army of the Warrior Cohort, which is...

"Characteristic of tribal societies and feudal states....There is no standing army. Contingents of warriors, led by tribal chieftains or feudal lords, muster for a specific battle or campaign....The key binding relationship is fealty."

But consider this. The Zulu army was part and parcel of a large, cohesive and expansionary kingdom in southern Africa. It was well-organized, highly disciplined and flexible. Its fierce warriors were well-trained and had strong esprit de corps.

A manoeuvre force, the Zulu army used speed, surprise, knowledge of terrain and encirclement tactics to pin and crush enemies. The age-grade system of compulsory service, and an organized logistics system, enabled Zulu kings to mobilize large forces and sustain them in the field for long periods.

This sounds more like an army of the Citizen-Soldier Cohort...

"Well-organized states field large armies of citizen-soldiers, either on a permanent basis or mobilized for war. States do this by imposing military service obligations on citizens...The key binding relationship is duty. This is underpinned by a pervasive sense of threat from outsiders, and myths of national and ethnic identity and warrior ethos."

It's not a perfect fit. But like a Zulu impi the cohorts are not intended to be rigid. I'd suggest that the Zulu army of Shaka and Cetshwayo belongs to the Citizen-Soldier Cohort, in good company with the Spartans, Napoleon's Grande Armée and others.

Simon Mann, mercenary - the movie

Sounds like mercenary Simon Mann wasn't treated too harshly during his 15 months jail time in Equatorial Guinea's notorious Black Beach prison...

"Mann has said he 'felt like a guest … and not like a prisoner ... and there were reports he dined on wine, chicken, steak and vegetables brought in from a nearby restaurant."

"He had his own cell, exercise machine and books and was allowed regular calls home. He often had lunch with ... the Security Minister, who would bring food and wine from his hotel..."

I can't wait to see the movie. But they're gonna have to jazz it up a bit. Actually, a lot. Eating steak, sipping wine and reading Dumas's The Count of Monte Cristo just won't cut it.

So, here's a couple of ideas for enhancing the plot...

Early on, prison thugs try to make Mann their bitch. He fights back with improvised weapons. That's where the steak knives and wine glasses come in handy. Along the way, Mann uses his accountancy skills to expose the money swindling scheme of the prison governor.

Later, Mann hatches a daring escape plan. It involves a wooden horse, tunnelling under the wire, and a motorbike jump to freedom. The prisoners break out but after a gunfight are recaptured. They're about to be shot when the presidential pardon comes through.

Still feels light, though. Any more ideas?

Mercenary dealt a get out of jail card

What skulduggery went on behind the scenes to secure mercenary Simon Mann's release?

Mann has been freed from a jail in Equatorial Guinea, one year into a 34 year prison sentence. Last year he was jailed for masterminding, if that's the right word, a failed coup d'état in the oil-rich West African state. Think Frederick Forsyth's The Dogs of War, minus the altruistic motives and sound planning and execution.

I wonder how long it is before the exclusive article, book and movie come out? These should give Mann some recompense for languishing for five years in African jails, and missing out on his fee for the coup, rumoured to be £10m plus double the expenses.

Piracy down in the Gulf of Aden

Check out David Axe's interview with Commodore Steve Chick, a Royal Navy officer leading a NATO counter-piracy fleet in the Gulf of Aden. 

"In this same period last year 17 ships were successfully pirated. This year we've only lost one. The factors I believe are making the case are firstly the merchant community are being much better in terms of implementing self protection measures.

Routinely now we're seeing merchant vessels transiting the waters having taken protection measures whether be fire hoses over the side, barbed wire on the railings, or ladders and other accesses to the ship secured."

>> Somali piracy series.

Caught my eye - network states, failed states, and Somali pirates

Here are several posts and articles that caught my eye recently:

• In a New Scientist sci-fi edition, Kim Stanley Robinson challenges eight British SF authors to write flash fiction about the world 100 years from now.

• Adam Elkus and John P Sullivan discuss the emergence of the "network state".

• Paul Harris considers whether California will become the world's next failed state.

• Oops! Somali pirates make a very silly mistake (h/t Coming Anarchy twitter).

Hart Group: a private military company with fingers in many pies

Al-Jazeera: "We spoke to one Somali man trained by Hart, who says those skills helped him hijack ships when he used to work as a pirate."

Hart Group is a private military company that does maritime security work in pirate waters around the Horn of Africa. In this strategic region Hart has fingers in many pies. In alliance with insurer Swinglehurst, Hart provides security teams on some ships transiting the Gulf of Aden. It reportedly operates an armed escort vessel out of Yemen. It trained and works with the Yemen Coast Guard.

And between 1999 and 2002, Hart had a contract with the government in Puntland, northern Somalia, to train men for a start-up fisheries patrol agency. Training included weapons handling, ship boarding, and maritime interdiction tactics.

In the clip below, Dan Nolan interviews Richard Bethell (Lord Westbury), head of Hart Group (h/t antobei at Close Protection World). In the clip, Bethell denies a suggestion that Hart's training of Somali seafarers contributed to the piracy problem. He also claims that he'd like to see an end to Somali piracy.

>> Somali piracy series

   

Posts on Somali piracy and maritime security companies

Here's a list of the posts that I've written so far on maritime security companies and anti-piracy in the Horn of Africa...

• "Hart Group: a private military company with fingers in many pies" - this features a video clip interview in which Hart boss Richard Bethell denies that his company helped train Somali pirates.

• "Special forces aren't that useful" - I interview a British consultant about maritime security in the Gulf of Aden.

• "AK-47s trump sound" - I talk with an American security contractor whose company is providing security to ships on the east-west transit of the Gulf of Aden.

• "Cry wolf? Yemen as the next failed state?" - what would happen to shipping in the Gulf of Aden if Yemen followed Somalia down to road to chaos?

• "Gulf of Aden: a lynch-pin of global trade" - this post features a cool map showing the intensity of global shipping routes.

• "Fighting piracy" - what services do maritime security companies provide to vessels transiting Horn of Africa waters?

• "PSCs called in to combat Somali piracy" - some of the maritime security companies that are (or claim to be) fighting pirates in the Gulf of Aden.

• "London law firms and Somali piracy" - who are the key London lawyers for Somali pirate hijackings, and what do they do?

• "Insurance for ships in Somali waters" - what marine and specialist insurance policies cover ships transiting the Gulf of Aden?

• "The profiteers" - introduction to companies that profit from Horn of Africa piracy.

I've also set this up as a separate page, which I'll update as required.

Caught my eye - oil's violent twilight and the world's worst goalie

Here are some articles and posts that caught my eye over the last week or so...

• The Oil Drum reviews Peter Maass's new book, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil. Think I'll add this to my reading list.

• Jeff Vail continues a series on "the diagonal economy" with a post on the impact of energy descent.

• In the Gulf of Aden, a boarding party from Australian frigate HMAS Toowoomba captures a boatload of Somali pirates and their guns. The German and Japanese navies help out too.

• Here's one for fans of the beautiful game: what happens when the world's worst striker meets the world's worst goalie? Via Pure Game.

• Finally, here's a great shot of Sydney's red dust storm (Wednesday), taken by Ian Sand...

"Special forces aren't that useful" - I interview a security consultant about anti-piracy work

Note: I'm researching companies that provide ship owners and marine insurers with security, crisis management and legal services to help them deal with the Somali piracy threat.

Yesterday I interviewed a British consultant about maritime security companies doing anti-piracy work in the Gulf of Aden. The consultant has a background in maritime and corporate security in the Middle East and Africa.

I asked him about ship security teams, specifically what makes for a good security officer.

The best security officers keep things simple, the consultant said. They use simple but effective measures to protect a ship against pirates, such as erecting barbed wire at vital points, and keeping good watch. They will also focus on the morale of the ship's crew. "This is something that people tend to forget about," he commented. A crew that is prepared and confident, and who feel that they are in good hands, is well-placed to ward off pirate attacks.

I observed that many maritime security companies advertise that they hire former special forces personnel, such as members of Britain's SAS.

"Ex-special forces types aren't necessarily the most useful people to have on-board," he replied, "particularly if they have no maritime experience".

Sea experience is crucial, the consultant said. Ideally you'd hire people who have previously served at sea. He suggested that people with the right kind of background include former Royal Marines with service in the Fleet Protection Group - "vessel security is their job" - and navy sailors and coastguards - "they are switched onto vessel security, know the workings and ins and outs of ships, and are familiar with boarding procedures".

The consultant emphasized that it's vital that security officers can get along with people from different cultures. This is because most merchant crews are from countries like India, Pakistan and the Philippines. And security officers, particularly team leaders, have to be smart, well-spoken and diplomatic: they must work effectively with a ship's officers, first and foremost the captain, and be able to advise, explain and persuade the officers on the best course of action to take.

Cry wolf? Yemen the next failed state?

There's been talk that Yemen is on the way to becoming the world's next failed state. Why? Ginny Hill explains that the government is fighting well-armed Shia rebels in the north, a separatist movement in the south, and active terrorist networks.

It pays to be cautious of "cry wolf" calls about failed states. Many westerners don't realize that conflict, at one level or another, is a fact of life in many places. Or that central government weakness and de facto local autonomy are the norm. Conflict + government weakness + local autonomy doesn't necessarily = failed state. Places can be pretty wild but still hang together.

Still, the implications of a collapsed Yemen state are interesting to ponder: two failed states, Somalia and Yemen, on either side of the Gulf of Aden, lynch-pin of global shipping. Nations are struggling to contain the threat of Somali piracy to shipping in the Gulf. How would the world cope with pirate attacks from both shores of the Gulf?

Gulf of Aden: a lynch pin of global trade

This map shows the intensity of global shipping routes*. You can see why the Gulf of Aden is a lynch pin for global trade: it's the quickest way between Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the eastern seaboard of North America.

This is why shipping companies find it difficult to evade the Somali pirate threat by re-routing ships around the Cape of Good Hope. It would add almost 4000 nautical miles to a passage from Singapore to Europe or from the Persian Gulf to the US eastern seaboard.

  

* Source: WDR 2009 “Reshaping Economic Geography”, World Bank (via Free Exchange).

Fighting piracy: private security companies in the Gulf of Aden

Note: I'm researching companies that provide ship owners and marine insurers with security, crisis management and legal services to help them deal with the Somali piracy threat.

On Thursday I wrote about private security companies (PSCs) doing anti-piracy work off the Horn of Africa. What services do these companies provide to ship owners?

• Shipboard security: small teams, usually three to six people, deploy to vessels for the duration of transits. Some board and disembark from Yemen ports. Others work longer transits, from Suez, Mombasa, Dar-es-Salaam, Durban, the UAE and Galle, Sri Lanka. This gives teams more time to get familiar with the ship, its crew and routines, and work out how to secure it. GoAGT charges US$35,000 for a transit through Yemen waters.

• Escorts through high risk waters: PVI has its own escort vessel. MAST advertises that it can charter ex-military patrol craft to escort super yachts. GEO/Shield, GoAGT and Muse utilize Yemen navy or coastguard vessels. GoAGT advertises that "a heavily armoured 37.5m Austral patrol boat" will accompany a ship (cost: US $45-55K). On the other hand, ISSG does not provide escorts: a company executive told me that "we feel that the only way to properly defend a vessel is from the vessel itself".

• Information and advice: companies provide ship owners and masters with voyage risk assessments and intelligence updates, advice on route planning and onboard security, crew training, and 24 hour monitoring during transits. Drum Cussac, for instance, will monitor a ship's progress and advise the master on changing threat levels. Muse utilize the services of an anti-piracy centre run by the Yemen government.
  

Security teams primarily seek to detect and deter pirates. "A properly and visibly secured vessel will likely be passed on by the pirates," a Gulf of Aden contractor told me. "They prefer a ship they can take quickly, without too much trouble". With approximately 200 ships transiting the Gulf of Aden daily, the pirates have many ships to choose from.

If deterrence doesn't work, security teams will try to make boarding difficult and dangerous for pirates. One way of doing this is having the ship change direction sharply so that the wash capsizes pirate boats. As a last resort, teams will try to stop pirates boarding and gaining access to the ship's superstructure, e.g., by using acoustic devices and high pressure firehoses.

Most security is non-lethal. Some companies, like REDfour, MAST and Muse Pro Group will provide armed guards, but this depends on the flags of the vessels. Other companies, like Drum-Cussac, equip their teams with non-lethal means of repelling boarders.

According to the Gulf of Aden contractor, companies engage security personnel when needed. They're often British, former special forces and marines. REDfour, for instance, recruit team leaders who've served in the SAS and SBS (Special Boat Service), the elite of British special forces units.

I asked the Gulf of Aden contractor why Brits, rather than say Americans, are used. It comes down to distance and expense, he said. "Teams are flown in from Heathrow to a port to board, and flown home to Heathrow at the end of the job. Flights from the US are too long and expensive".

But some companies look beyond the British armed forces for security personnel. Some US-flagged vessels carry armed American guards. Muse employs former American servicemen - former US Navy SEALS, Special Forces and Delta soldiers. A Muse company executive told me that "time in service, combat experience and training is what we look for. And a good brain". GoAGT uses Yemeni soldiers and coastguards. ISSG recruits former marine commandos from the Indian navy, with a minimum of 15 years military service and mariner qualifications. 

Related posts

> Private security companies called in to combat Somali piracy

> Law firms and Somali piracy

> Insurance for ships in Somali waters

> The profiteers: companies making money from Somali piracy

Private security companies called in to combat Somali piracy

Note: I'm researching companies that provide ship owners and marine insurers with security, crisis management and legal services to help them deal with the Somali piracy threat. See this page for a list of all posts on this topic.

With the surge in Somali piracy over the last 18 months or so, private security companies (PSCs) have been busy providing ship owners with security for vessel transits through the Gulf of Aden.

As well as protecting vessels and crews against attacks, such arrangements help lower the cost of marine insurance premiums that are underwritten by Lloyds of London syndicates.

The PSCs are mostly British-based, although American firms are also getting in on the action. They have close links to the shipping industry and insurance companies. The list of companies that claim to be operating off the Horn of Africa is lengthy - here are some of them:

Drum-Cussac

A British firm (based in Jersey) which has been in the maritime security business for a long time. It deploys security teams that use non-lethal force to repel pirates. Drum Cussac works with Dryad Maritime Intelligence Service, a specialist intelligence provider to the shipping and marine insurance industries.

Maritime Security Solutions (MSS)

Another British firm with longstanding experience in the maritime security business. MSS can provide security teams either armed or equipped with non-lethal devices. Seem to recruit mainly ex British armed forces personnel, and like many PSCs claim to have many former special forces soldiers on the books.

Maritime & Underwater Security Consultants (MUSC)

Established in 1973, and based in London, MUSC offers a range of anti-piracy services globally, including planning, risk management, training and security for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden. If a pirate hijack takes place, MUSC can organize hostage negotiation and coordinate ransom drops and the recovery of the crew and vessel. MUSC works with specialist insurance broker Special Contingency Risks Ltd (SCR) to provide maritime kidnap and ransom (K&R) cover to ship owners.

GEO & Shield Consulting

A London-based firm which works with the Yemen Coast Guard (in partnership with Lotus Projects, a Yemen company) to provide onboard security teams and escort vessels during passages through Yemeni waters.

Gulf of Aden Group Transits (GoAGT)

Formerly British-based Anti Piracy Maritime Security Solutions, a company which was involved in the MS Biscaglia incident in Nov 2008. Like GEO/Shield, GoAGT works with the Yemen Coast Guard and Lotus to provide ships with guards and vessel escorts on Gulf transits. It claims to be not-for-profit.

Nick Davis, the key player in APMSS and GoAGT, has recently established the Merchant Maritime Warfare Centre, an anti-piracy training centre, in the UK.

HP Terra-Marine International

Sister company of US-based Hollowpoint Protection. It's licensed by the Yemen government to operate from Yemeni ports. [Update, 15 September 2009: the CE of a British maritime security company told me that HP Terra-Marine are no longer trading.]

Protection Vessels International Ltd (PVI)

A British-based firm which provides shipboard guards and an escort. It has its own escort vessel, which is crewed by former Royal Marines.

MAST (Maritime Asset Security & Training)

A British-based company which specializes in protecting super yachts. MAST works with Watkins Marine Services Ltd, a yacht managing company which is linked to Watkins, a Lloyds of London syndicate, and Pilgrims Security Ltd, which is based in the Seychelles.

Muse Pro Group

A US-based private military company. Its maritime wing (MAPS) works closely with the Yemen Navy and Coast Guard and local associate Alqusoor. Muse provides armed security parties for transits through Yemeni waters. It recruits security personnel who've served with American elite units, like US Navy SEALS, Special Forces and Delta.

Former US Special Forces soldier Charles Kunuff is the senior executive in charge of Muse's maritime operation (see here for my interview with Mr Kunuff).

Hart Group

A global PSC with its HQ in Cyprus. Its maritime division used to be called Global Marine Security Systems. Hart trained and works with the Yemen Coast Guard, and reportedly has an escort vessel stationed in Yemen. Insurance company Swinglehurst Ltd offers shipowners war risk cover (including piracy risk) on Gulf transits where the ships are protected by Hart security personnel.

Here's an Al-Jazeera interview (h/t Close Protection World) with Richard Bethell (Lord Westbury), former British SAS officer and head of Hart. In the clip, Bethell denies suggestions that Hart trained many of today's Somali pirates. Between 1999 and 2002, Hart had a contract with the government in Puntland, northern Somalia, to train men for a start-up fisheries protection agency.

REDfour MSS Ltd

The maritime wing of British company REDfour Security Group (which provides security services in Africa, the Middle East and Asia). It offers a range of services to shipowners, including onboard armed or unarmed security, depending on the flags of vessels. REDfour has signed an agreement with leading insurance broker Marsh to provide security for over 900 transits a year. Will McManus is REDfour MSS's chief executive.

ISSG Holdings Ltd

A Seychelles-based company that provides security to vessels in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa waters. ISSG mainly hires ex-Indian navy commandos for its security staff. Michael Murrell is the company's chief executive. It has recently developed an anti-piracy training course for seafarers to be taught at the MATS College of Technology in the Philippines.

London law firms and Somali piracy

Note: I'm researching companies that provide ship owners and marine insurers with security, crisis management and legal services to help them deal with the Somali piracy threat.

You're a ship owner. One of your ships is sailing through the pirate-infested waters of the Horn of Africa. You get a call - Somali pirates have hijacked your vessel and its crew and are demanding a hefty ransom. What to do? Ring Xe (aka Blackwater) and get them to send in a hit team of mercenaries, right?

Wrong. What you will do is quickly call your marine insurer. You may also engage one of several London-based law firms who handle piracy kidnap and ransom situations.

These firms have close connections with the shipping industry and the Lloyd's insurance market, and extensive experience of admiralty and marine insurance matters. In a crisis they will advise you on:

• managing the emergency response to the hijack;

• engaging a private security contractor to negotiate with the pirates and carry out the ransom drop;

• the legal aspects of paying a ransom; and 
  

• dealing with the news media.
  

After the ship and its crew have been freed, your lawyer will also help you recover part of the cost of the ransom from other parties with interests in the voyage, like the cargo owners and the ship's charterer.

Three law firms appear to have particular expertise in dealing with kidnaps and ransoms at sea:

• Holman Fenwick Willan, which was established in 1883 by a prominent shipping family, is the leader in the field. Partner James Gosling is an acknowledged piracy expert. As at April 2009 he had advised shipowners in almost 30 ransom negotiations off the Horn of Africa. Partner Toby Stephens is another piracy expert.

• Ince & Co has acted for war risk underwriters and shipowners in piracy kidnaps and ransoms in the Horn of Africa, the Niger Delta and the Straits of Malacca. Partner Stephen Askins, a former officer in the Royal Marines, is the firm's leading piracy expert.

• Stephenson Harwood has also been involved in hijack situations. Partner Duncan MacDonald, a specialist in negotiations and contractual disputes, appears to be this firm's main piracy expert.

I was told by a private security consultant (who has experience of Gulf of Aden security work) that Somali pirates are looking to engage their own London lawyers to represent them in negotiations. It's interesting to ponder the legal implications of lawyers acting for pirates in kidnap and ransom situations.

Was the Lockerbie bomber set free in a squalid oil deal?

A seedy angle on the release of the Lockerbie bomber is emerging. It sounds like the UK government agreed to set free Abdelbaset al-Megrahi as part of a deal allowing oil majors BP and Shell to tap Libyan oil reserves.

Here's what the Times has to say:

"The strong circumstantial evidence is that a lucrative agreement to allow BP to explore for oil off the Libyan coast was being held up by Mr Megrahi’s exemption from the prisoner transfer programme. The idea that the Westminster government had no view and no influence is not credible."

And the Guardian:

"...ministers and senior civil servants met Shell to discuss the company's oil interests in Libya on at least 11 occasions and perhaps as many as 26 times in less than four years....

The revelations, showing that the government invested large amounts of political capital in securing North African oil, lend weight to claims that commercial interest lay behind last week's decision to release the Lockerbie bomber...from jail in Scotland to receive a hero's welcome in Libya."

Big picture implications?

Once again a democratically elected government seems to have allowed itself to be used as a tool to further the business interests of a coterie of very rich people. The close links between the UK government and Big Oil cast real doubt on Whitehall's commitment to negotiating an effective global climate change treaty at Copenhagen in December. And as long as people like this "run the show", the UK government will never grapple seriously with big concerns like peak oil, resource depletion, and the need to make a transition to a low carbon economy.

Insurance for ships in Somali waters

Introductory note: I'm researching companies that are profitting from Somali piracy.

If you're a shipowner and your ships are sailing through the pirate-infested waters of the Horn of Africa, what sort of marine and specialist insurance cover will you be carrying?

• Hull insurance covers the ship, while cargo insurance covers the goods and commodities that the ship carries.

• War risk covers a ship for damage while sailing through a war zone (which Hull doesn't cover). There are two main types: war risk liability, which covers people and items inside the ship, and war risk hull, which covers the ship itself.

• Protection and indemnity ("P&I") insures the shipowner against third party liabilities and expenses that may come from owning or operating ships, e.g., collisions with other ships, claims from injured crew.

• Kidnap and ransom ("K&R") covers the cost of dealing with a pirate hijacking - it indemnifies the assured for ransoms, and pays for crisis response, hostage negotiations, ransom drops, legal advice and so on. Traditional cover meets the price of ransom but not the extra costs - a ransom will be around 25 - 30% of the total cost of dealing with a pirate attack.

Hiscox is a leading K&R insurer. It claims to write about two-thirds of global K&R policies. Hiscox retains private security corporation Control Risks to provide its K&R clients with crisis response services if their ships are hijacked by pirates.

London-based Control Risks was founded in 1975, initially as a subsidiary of an insurance broker. It's one of the world's biggest private security corporations, with maritime security but one of its business activities.

As well as crisis response, which can include negotiating with pirates and ransom drops, Control Risks assesses risk for shipowners and advises on voyage planning and counter-piracy measures. It can provide shipboard security teams and monitoring and operational support while vessels are sailing through pirate waters.

"AK-47s trump sound" - an interview with a security contractor about Somali piracy

While researching Somali piracy and private security companies, I've been in touch with a number of company executives and consultants.

One of these men is Charles Kuneff, senior partner in US-based Muse Pro Group. Muse is a private military company which operates in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Its maritime wing, Muse Anti Piracy Solutions, is based in Yemen and works in partnership with the Yemen government. Muse provides onboard security to ships on the east-west transit in the Gulf of Aden.

I spoke with Charles on Thursday via Skype. He gave me interesting insights into the operations of a security company engaged in anti-piracy work. Here's an edited transcript of some of the things we discussed...

"AK-47s trump sound"

"What's the main service that Muse provides to ship owners to help them counter piracy?"

Charles Kuneff: "After the Maersk incident [April 2009] we stopped doing non-lethal escorts. Now we only provide armed escorts. Currently 85% of our escorts take place in Yemen waters."

"Did you decide that it was too dangerous not to arm security personnel? Or that the stakes were getting too high? Is this increasingly what your clients want - armed security?"

"Yes. We've worked in Iraq and Afghanistan, and feel this is the best way - fight fire with fire but not show it until the time is right. If you remember a security company called APMSS that had a ship hijacked [the MV Biscaglia, 28 Nov 2008] - well, the only thing they had was a LRAD [long-range acoustic device]. AK-47s trump sound."

"We board at sea"

"Do you board and disembark security teams from Yemeni ports? Do you work longer transits?"

"We board at sea, we will quote for a longer transit, but why take money for nothing? Maybe when the threat level changes - we will of course adjust services to suit the needs of the clients.

"So, when you put a team onto a ship, what sort of things would they do when onboard? For example, would they secure the ship, help keep watch?"

"Ship risk assessment survey is first. The team leader will walk the ship and find the best place for the crew in case of attack, post a guard watch depending on the latest threat reports. The number of guards posted depends on the ship's position in the transit, but all will be ready for quick reaction. In the day we'll do drills when everything is clear."

"Does the security team have shore support during the transit, like intelligence updates, threat level assessments?"

"Of course. That's why we use the Yemen Coastguard/navy as our main element, and the government's anti-piracy centre."

"Navy SEALS are not cheap..."

"Muse's PMC business recruits former Ukrainian special forces soldiers.  Is that the same for Muse's maritime business?"

"The Ukrainians work mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are talking about bringing some of the best to work in the Gulf of Aden as liasion officers.

For the maritime operation, we recruit former US Navy SEALS, Special Forces, Delta, even Rangers as team leaders. Navy SEALS are not cheap but they have the training and experience to handle most situations by themselves. TCNs [third country nationals - Yemenis] make up a security team with a well qualified team leader to control everything."

"What sort of experience and personal qualities do you look for?"

"We want combat experience. We look at a man's training, how long was it, who were the instructors. Time in service, combat experience and training is what we look for. And a good brain."

The profiteers: companies making money from Somali piracy

Who are the western companies that are profiting from Somali piracy? And how do they make their money?

I'm researching these questions for an article. So far I've identified an assortment of companies that are engaged in security activities relating to Somali piracy and hostage-taking in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Generally speaking, these companies are involved in one or more of the following activities:

• Security for ships: private security companies, like Hart and Secopex, provide guards and non-lethal weapons on ships, training for crews in piracy countermeasures, and advice to shipowners on operational security and risk management.

• Crisis management: London-based law firms, like Holman Fenwick Willan, coordinate responses to hostage-taking on behalf of shipping clients. They engage specialist companies, such as Control Risks, to manage crises, conduct negotiations with pirates, and carry out ransom drops. Law firms also provide shipowners with legal advice, e.g., on the legality of paying ransoms. 

• Marine insurance: companies like Cooper Gay write kidnap and ransom ("K&R") policies for shippers. Hiscox also provides shippers with crisis management teams. In 2008, Swinglehurst Ltd teamed with Hart to provide shippers with war risk cover (including piracy risks) for vessels protected by Hart personnel transiting the Gulf of Aden.

• Intelligence, analysis and monitoring: companies such as Dryad Maritime Intelligence provide piracy threat assessments to shippers. The ICC International Maritime Bureau runs a 24-hour Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur.

As the maritime capital of the world, London is the hub for most of this activity. Collaboration between companies appears commonplace. Gulf of Aden security work seems to be dominated by British firms, but American companies, like Xe (formerly known as Blackwater) and Hollowpoint, are getting in on the action.

Piracy as a business opportunity

Fancy setting up as a pirate? In "Cutthroat capitalism", Scott Carney outlines the economics and business model of Somali piracy...

"Most of Somalia's modern-day pirates are fishermen who traded nets for guns. They've learned that ransom is more profitable than robbery, and rather than squandering their loot, they reinvest in equipment and training. Today, no ship is safe within several hundred miles of the Somali coast."

Somali piracy seems to involve a cosy and lucrative arrangement where most of the parties - pirates, their financiers, insurers and private security contractors - can make loads of money.

Meanwhile taxpayers are hit with the cost of maintaining maritime forces in the area. The threat of naval intervention is an important element in the ransom process, but are the shipping insurers and security contractors paying the taxpayers their dues or getting a free ride? I suspect the latter - it's the good old public cost, private profit equation.

Secondly, if piracy is so lucrative, how come people elsewhere aren't getting into it as well? Is Somali piracy the start of a global trend? Or is there a combination of factors - like high shipping volumes, narrow waterways, secure bases for illegal operations (Somalia), skilled manpower (expert seafarers and gunmen), and many ways to make money - that make piracy around the Horn of Africa a uniquely profitable situation?

Cool Somali pirate game to play

It's cool computer game time. Check out "Cutthroat Capitalism" at Wired...

"You are a pirate commander staked with $50,000 from local tribal leaders and other investors. Your job is to guide your pirate crew through raids in and around the Gulf of Aden, attack and capture a ship, and successfully negotiate a ransom."

Caught my eye - freelance hackers and puppet stooges

Some blog posts and articles that caught my eye this week...

• China plans to use its massive foreign exchange reserves to snap up overseas natural and energy resources.

• David Rondfeldt blogs about collaborative communities as a way of organizing for cyber security.

• Desertec is one step closer to generating electricity from sunlight falling on North African deserts.
  

• Dark Visitor notes a poll of China's netizens: asked which criminal job they'd prefer, most chose freelance hacker over human trafficker, assassin, drug dealer, gambler, gang leader, spy and robber.

• On the 56th anniversary of the great Fatherland Liberation War, a North Korean war hero recalls the defeat of the US imperialist aggressors and their puppet stooges.

Caught my eye...

Here are some articles that caught my eye over the last week:

• Wealthy countries, worried about food security, scramble for arable land in Africa, South America and Russia. This land grab, and likely indigenous resistance to it, are trends worth watching.

• Al Jazeera's Kamal Hyder reports from the Swat Valley on the Pakistan army's "mopping up" operations against the Taliban (vids here and here). Note the General's immaculately pressed fatigues and his walking cane - talk about a throwback to the Raj.

• In Pyongyang, the Paektusan Czech-Korean Friendship Association and the Czech Group for the Study and Materialization of the Juche Idea bitterly denounced the US imperialists and their south Korean puppet stooges for their hostile war moves.

Cocaine cartels - my enemy's enemy is my friend

The Guardian is running a set of investigative articles on the Latin American cocaine trade and the 'war on drugs'. This display highlights the main South American production areas (Colombia, Bolivia, Peru), the transit areas (Mexico and West Africa) and the destinations (the US and Europe).

It's well established that attempts to cut supply, like the 'war on drugs', only pump up demand and price, and thereby encourage criminals to find more ingenious ways of getting product to market, e.g., through failed states in West Africa.

Another interesting dynamic of the 'war on drugs' is that it seems to be an evolutionary process that selects for suppliers who are smarter, more adaptable and better organized; those who aren't as smart, adaptable and organized get eliminated. It may also provide new business opportunities for the "fittest", who are able to take over the production capacity and market share left fallow by their former competitors.

In a sense, if you're a drug cartel boss, and you're smart, adaptable and well-organized, then perversely the security forces could be your best friends. If you stay a few steps ahead of them, hopefully they'll take out the competition, leaving the field to you. The heat will also force you to keep your operations lean and mean.

I'll admit that this is speculative. I'd be interested to hear what others have to say about this, including bloggers - like AE and Soob - who have studied the 'war on drugs' and the narco-insurgency in Mexico.

Somali pirates are stealthier than stealth warships

Sven Ortmann at Defense and Freedom makes this counter-intuitive observation about naval stealth capabilities:

"The East African pirates are more 'stealthy' than all those easily identified 'stealth' warships which are low-observable at best. They use disguise for stealth instead of low reflexivity. You see them, but you cannot identify them as what they are unless you search their ship. The same principle as used by intelligence services, ninjas, criminals, and most insurgents."

This kind of "Q-ship" approach is something the New Zealand Navy could be thinking about. To counter the great Chinese invasion of 2037, arm fishing boats with cruise missiles and send them amongst the PLAN's invasion fleet, like wolves in sheep's clothing.

Or use these boats - sans missiles - to carry out covert fisheries surveillance and intelligence gathering inside foreign deep sea fishing fleets operating in New Zealand's maritime region.

Executive Outcomes founder starts a blog

These days even ex-mercenaries are writing blogs.

In 1989, Eeben Barlow, a former South African special forces officer, founded Executive Outcomes, a mercenary company. Executive Outcomes operated mainly in Africa in the 1990s, fighting in Angola and Sierra Leone. Disbanded in 1998, the company gained a reputation as a highly effective private military force.

Now Barlow is working as a consultant and blogging* about military and security matters. Check out his blog, especially this post which suggests ways that companies can fight criminal gangs that are preying on their activities. (I assume that Barlow is talking about places like South Africa, where crime is rampant and the police are often ineffective and corrupt.)

He has good advice about how companies should handle contracts with security firms:

"Do they usually know anything about the company providing their security? Have they made the security company liable for any burglary, theft or other losses they may suffer while under their watch? Are security companies given a time-line in which to perform adequately and resolve the crime issues within a company?"

Barlow suggests that to combat organized crime, large companies should develop their own in-house intelligence collection and assessment capabilities, and the means to counter criminal activities.

* h/t Zenpundit

Peace Corps worker sees the light

Here's a thorny problem (h/t: Adrian).

You're living in a small village in Mali, Africa, as a US Peace Corps worker*. You need to recharge your car battery so that you have light to read at night. But you don't want to compromise your principles by (a) recharging the battery with a petrol generator because you oppose the use of fossil fuels, or (b) recharging with a solar array because you'd have to join the local church which owns the array and accept the Word of God.

Bugger!

Click here to find out what the volunteer does to see the light.

*Yes, the Peace Corps is still around, and no it's not an Orwellian term for the US Marine Corps.

"Global Trends 2025" - dog eat dog for control of resources

I continue reading the US National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed" report, and briefly comment on things that interest me.

Chapter 5 of "Global Trends 2025" discusses the "growing potential for conflict" - insurgencies, civil wars, interstate conflicts - particularly in the greater Middle East. It suggests that states could fight over scarce energy resources. As demand for energy heats up, states will try to lock in unfettered access to oil and minerals...

"this could lead to interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources to be essential to maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime."

We'd be foolish to ignore the possibility of state vs state conflict. But as the report suggests, it's a worst case scenario. I'd suggest that what will happen, in parts of Africa (like Congo and Niger delta), central Asia and Latin America, is violence around oil fields and mines as a byproduct of competition for access by governments, foreign corporations and hybrid corporate-criminal organizations.

How could this play out? Here's some ideas:

• Foreign corporations use proxies ( local militias and paramilitary forces, criminal gangs, private military companies) to protect their interests and destabilize competitors.
  

• Regional power-brokers - warlords, corrupt officials, crime bosses and insurgents - fight for control of resources and trade.
  

• Locals living near oilfields and mines fight back as their lands, forests and rivers are confiscated and devastated.

A final thought. In this dog eat dog world, multi-national corporations will be out-gunned by local warlords and bandits unless they come equipped with their own heavies, or enter business arrangements with said warlords and bandits.

China sends forces to fight Somali pirates

The Times reports that China is sending three warships to Somali waters, to join the international anti-pirate naval force.

"The three vessels - the missile-armed destroyers DDG-171 Haikou and DDG-169 Wuhan and the Weishanhu supply ship - are among the most sophisticated in the Chinese navy, all entering service this decade..."

Hardly surprising. Beijing needs secure sea lanes for exporting goods and importing commodities - like oil, minerals and timber - from the Middle East and Africa. It is developing significant interests in minerals and timber in Africa. British historian Niall Ferguson sees this as China creating an "informal nascent empire in commodity-rich Africa".

Take no pirates prisoner

Responding to "Sea Dogs of War", Tom S said this about the seeming reluctance of western navies to confront Somali pirates:

"Listening to [National Radio] tonight, they said that Western navies were reluctant to engage the pirates due to the "unclear legal status" of doing so.

Now, call me crazy, but isn't engaging and destroying pirate vessels and killing pirates a key reason navies came into existence in the first place? I would have thought any navy worth its salt would simply engage any and all pirates on sight."

As Tom suggests, it was much simpler in the old days. The Royal Navy put paid to the pirate menace during the "Golden Age of Piracy" of the early 18th century by patrolling pirate-infested waters and attacking pirate strongholds. In 1718, the sloop Ranger trapped and slew the notorious pirate Blackbeard and his crew off North Carolina's Outer Banks. In 1722, off the West African coast, HMS Swallow attacked and destroyed the pirate ships of Bartholomew Roberts, the Golden Age's most successful pirate. Roberts was killed and the pirate survivors were hanged. These actions led to piracy's eradication in North Atlantic and West African waters.

These days navies are, to a certain extent, constrained by rules. In 2008 the UN Security Council authorized states to:

• enter Somalia's territorial waters and use "all necessary means" to repress piracy at sea;  
• use "all necessary means" to actively fight piracy on the high seas off the Somali coast.

But repression of piracy must be carried out in ways consistent with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 100 of the Convention sets down that all states must cooperate to repress piracy on the high seas. But the Convention limits the use of force. It allows warships to seize pirate ships and arrest pirates on board (Articles 105 and 107). Unless attacked first, warships cannot open fire. Under Article 110, the warship has to "verify the ship's right to fly its flag"...

"it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship..."

These legal restraints are a check on action. But they are not insurmountable, as recent actions show. On 11 November, British commandos from HMS Cumberland killed two pirates and captured their vessel. Last Tuesday an Indian warship, INS Tabar, destroyed a pirate 'mother ship'. In a statement the Indian navy said that...

"On repeated calls, the vessel's threatening response was that she would blow up the naval warship. INS Tabar retaliated in self defence and opened fire on the mother vessel. As a result of the firing by INS Tabar, fire broke out on the vessel and explosions were heard, possibly due to exploding ammunition that was stored on the vessel."

It's hard to imagine that the desperadoes would have been foolish enough to threaten the Indian warship. But there you have it - no pirates have come forward to contradict the Indian navy's version of events.

Here be tigers (and Nelson Mandela)

Maybe we should add "Pirates"? 

H/t Global Dashboard.

Sea dogs of war

It was only a matter of time before private military companies like Blackwater seized the business opportunities on offer off the coast of Somalia (h/t Tom S)...

"...Blackwater is planning to cash in on the rising threat of piracy on the high seas by launching a flotilla of gunboats for hire by the shipping companies.

The firm, which gained international notoriety when its staff killed civilians in Iraq, has already equipped one vessel, called The McArthur, which will carry up to 40 armed guards and have a landing pad for an attack helicopter.

The McArthur, a former survey ship, arrives in the Gulf of Aden, the scene of the recent high-profile hijackings and shootouts with Somali pirates, at the end of the year. It is to be joined by three or four similar vessels over next year to form the company's private navy."

As long as governments are unwilling or unable to plug this particular hole in the global security system, PMCs will look for a piece of the action. Fundamentally there's little difference between mercenaries riding shotgun on supply convoys in Iraq or on ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden.  

Why worry about piracy?

Somali pirates are back in the news again after hijacking a Saudi oil supertanker, the Sirius Star. The ship was seized on the high seas, 450 nautical miles southeast of Mombassa, Kenya. John Robb observed that the "holes in the global security system are so big now, that you can drive a super-tanker through them".

Clearly, some pirate gangs have considerable reach. In one of two informative commentaries in The Times, Roger Middleton explains that the pirates

"have reinvested their takings – now averaging well over $1 million per captured ship – in faster boats, electronic devices such as satellite phones, and powerful weapons. As their equipment improves they have been able to push farther out into the ocean and threaten ever more important vessels."

And Frank Pope explains how ship owners view the risk associated with piracy, and why they're reluctant to station armed guards on vessels.

Pope seems in two minds about how to deal with Somali pirates. On the one hand he states that the "only way to stop piracy off Somali is to sort out what is happening on land". Given the recent history of Somalia, this is not plausible. His other idea, for governments to commit more naval resources to improve sea lane security, is better.

The issue though is whether the cost of Somali piracy justifies the cost of mounting a major naval operation. A commentator on Global Guerrillas observed that the "odds of piracy are vanishingly small - 22,000 vessels pass the Somali / Yemeni chokepoint each year. Around one in a thousand get pirated successfully. That's roughly the same odds as getting wrecked each year".

Pope suggests that shipowners aren't too fussed about Somali piracy, not only because of the long odds, but also because pirated vessels, crews and cargo can be quickly ransomed. If that's the case, and ships continue to transit the Gulf of Aden (rather than go the long way around the Cape of Good Hope), why should governments be too concerned?

The big issues that nobody talked about

What were the big international issues that McCain and Obama didn't talk about during the election campaign?

Foreign Policy lists five big ones (h/t What You Must Read): China's rise; drug violence in Mexico; instability in Somalia; the global food crisis; and illegal immigration (into the United States).

I thought that Keating's take on the drug war raging in Mexico was unusual and insightful:

"Sadly, the United States is funding both sides of this war. While Mexico receives US taxpayer money to fight the war on drugs through a $400 million aid package, the cartels perpetuating the barbaric violence are being funded by Americans' demand for cocaine and narcotics. It's also estimated that 90 per cent of the weapons used by the cartels are purchased at US gun stores and gun shows...

The Bullshit Files: Pirates of Puntland

The tale about Somali pirates at the 'port' of Eyl just keeps getting taller and taller. According to Mary Harper, the BBC's Africa analyst...

"Whenever word comes out that pirates have taken yet another ship in the Somali region of Puntland, extraordinary things start to happen.

There is a great rush to the port of Eyl, where most of the hijacked vessels are kept by the well-armed pirate gangs.

People put on ties and smart clothes. They arrive in land cruisers with their laptops, one saying he is the pirates' accountant, another that he is their chief negotiator."

I emailed the BBC and asked if Mary Harper has actually visited the 'port' of Eyl. I also asked how her description of this booming port, with its smartly dressed people with laptops and land cruisers, squares with reality - that Eyl looks to be a very remote village. Oh, and that there's no port there, just the mouth of a creek and a small fishing outpost.

The BBC has yet to respond. Until they do I've got no choice but to chalk this one up to the Bullshit Files.    

Pirates in Puntland

More questionable claims about Somali pirate activity on the Horn of Africa, this time in a Reuters article:

"An unidentified warship off pirate-ridden Somali waters captured 14 pirates and destroyed their boat, a minister of the northern Puntland region said..."

This is quite a feat. Oddly, no-one has claimed credit for it, even though a recent United Nation Security Council resolution authorizes foreign forces to use "all necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery" in Somali waters. 

The article continues...

"Two French nationals [are being held] in a hill village [called Habo] 750 km (465 miles) east of Bosasso, Puntland's capital, a man who said he was the pirates' servant told Reuters on Sunday..."

There is no hill village 750 km due east of Bosasso - just the open sea of the Indian Ocean. Some 600 km south of Bosasso there is a place named Habo, but it is well inland, in the midst of a desert, and there is no sign of human habitation.

Meanwhile, at Eyl...

"Somali gunmen are holding more than 10 ships for ransom at Eyl, a lawless former fishing outpost now used by gangs behind a sharp rise in sea attacks...[They] are also demanding a ransom of more than $9 million to free two Malaysian tankers, a Japanese-managed bulk carrier and a Nigerian tug boat. The pirates are currently holding over 130 crew members."

Well, at least Reuters doesn't describe Eyl as a port, unlike this BBC article. But as I wrote earlier, it's a stretch to think that a large number of ships are berthed just off the shore of this ramshackle village.

For one thing, it would be easy for foreign warships to recapture such ships. For another, it makes more sense for pirates to scuttle the ships, seize the crews, hide them in remote caves or encampments, and negotiate for ransom money.

Somali pirates and their lair

This BBC article reports that Malaysia is deploying naval vessels to the Gulf of Aden to protect Malaysian merchant ships from Somali pirates. Some pirates have their lair at Eyl, on Somalia's Indian Ocean coast:

"Two Malaysian tankers...were seized last month by Somali pirates....Officials in the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland say the ships are being held at the port of Eyl, a lawless outpost controlled by gangs.

Puntland's minister for mines...told the BBC Somali Service from a hill overlooking the port that he could count eight captured vessels. He said another two were reported to be on their way to Eyl....

I was intrigued to think that these desperadoes control a port, albeit one that might be rather rundown after decades of lawlessness and civil war. So I checked out Eyl and its 'port' on Google Maps.

As you can see in the aerial photo (taken some time ago), there's no port; just a ramshackle coastal village, a languid stream which flows into the sand, and a long sandy beach. Fishing boats are drawn up on the beach. A track leads inland to Eyl proper, a dilapidated village three kilometres inland as the crow flies. This jerky video gives you a feel for what the place is like. 

It's possible that the Malaysian crews, and those of other vessels, are being held in or near Eyl. But it's a stretch to think that eight ships are berthed just offshore.

 

View Larger Map

In the Phoenicians' Wake

The Phoenicians were the great seafarers of the ancient Mediterranean world. They are thought to have made the first circumnavigation of Africa around 600 BC.

Now a group of modern adventurers has built a replica sailing vessel and set sail from Syria to retrace the Phoenicians' voyage (h/t Eddie). According to this tracking site, Phoenicia has made landfall in Egypt, at the entrance to the Suez Canal. 

In The Histories, Herodotus chronicled the Phoenicians' successful voyage:

"The Phoenicians sailed from the Arabian gulf into the southern ocean, and every autumn put in at some convenient spot on the [African] coast, sowed a patch of ground, and waited for next year's harvest. Then, having got in their grain, they put to sea again, and after two full years rounded the Pillars of Heracles in the course of the third, and returned to Egypt."

The next man to try, Sataspes, wasn't so lucky. According to Herodotus, Sataspes, who had been ordered by Xerxes, King of Persia, to sail around Africa as punishment for a heinous crime, "took fright at the length and loneliness of the voyage and turned back".

Bad move, because when Sataspes returned to the Persian court, Xerxes had him impaled. The Phoenicia mariners may have to contend with pirates, rough waters, and cramped conditions, but at least if they fail they won't have to worry about that fate.

Raiders of the Lost Archives: The Indirect Approach

Each week I ransack the lost archives of The Strategist, to recall what I posted a year ago to the day (or thereabouts).

On 18 August 2007 I wrote about British strategist Basil Liddell Hart and his concept of the 'indirect approach'. In Alchemist of War, Alex Danchev described the indirect approach as "more an attitude of mind that an arrow on the map" - about thinking flexibly and in unorthodox fashion about military problems.

I've just finished reading Edward Paice's Tip and Run, a history of the German East African campaign during the Great War (1914-18). It's a shame that the British and South African commanders who tried to bring to heel Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck's German forces didn't apply the indirect approach in their thinking.

Having captured German East Africa by the end of 1917, and chased Lettow-Vorbeck's forces into Portuguese East Africa, there was no need for the British to send, as they did, large infantry bodies, supported by vast numbers of porters, after the Germans. Lettow-Vorbeck's game plan was to tie down British and imperial troops in East Africa - in combat, garrisons and lines of communication. By trying to unequivocally crush German resistance, the British played right into his hands.

Instead, the British should have recognized that Lettow-Vorbeck's depleted and diseased troops posed little real threat, and responded proportionately. A strategy of sending small mobile units of askari (African soldiers) to harry Lettow-Vorbeck's units and ravage their food supplies would have pinned the Germans in a remote corner of Africa for the rest of the war with minimal outlay.

There were precedents for this sort of strategy in the British military tradition. These included the later stages of the New Zealand wars (late 1860s/early 1870s), after the withdrawal of imperial forces, when small colonial bush-fighting units pursued Maori rebels through forests and mountains.

What I'm Reading: "Tip and Run"

Who?

Edward Paice

What?

Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa (2007).

Why?

I haven't read much in the way of military history recently. So I bought Tip and Run, an account of the fighting in East Africa between British imperial and German forces during World War One. 

Last of the Wild Geese?

A ragtag bunch of mercenaries, a failed coup attempt, a sham trial in a African dictatorship...it was never going to end well for Simon Mann. In 2004 the British mercenary tried to replace President Obiang, the tyrant of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea, with a puppet who would comply with Western corporate interests. Now, Mann has been sentenced to 34 years jail in Malabo's notorious Black Beach prison.

Mann, 56, has already spent time in a Zimbabwe prison: "If I have got to push it I have got to push it," he said. "And at least I know now that I can push it after four years in Zimbabwe".

From the 1960s there's been a colourful tradition of white mercenaries - 'Mad Mike' Hoare, 'Colonel' Bob Denard, Simon Mann - staging coups in ramshackle African countries. Frederick Forsyth even wrote a cracking good novel, The Dogs of War, about a coup d'état in the 'Republic of Zangaro'.

With Mann's incarceration, have we have seen the last of these Wild Geese and their rather amateurish efforts to overthrow African despots? I'm picking that as global competition for dwindling oil supplies heats up, we'll see enterprises that are better organized and financed, led by private military companies which have tacit understandings with western governments and their agents.

Weekend Reading: Heidi Holland on Robert Mugabe

In December 2007 Heidi Holland interviewed Robert Mugabe. She wrote about the experience for the BBC:

"Earlier, I had spotted a massive banner inside the presidency on which the words 'Mugabe is right' were emblazoned. His staff's obsequious laughter each time he made a sarcastic remark confirmed that their conditions of service included internalising the idea that he can do no wrong."

Holland's profile is unremarkable, a stock portrait of tyranny which panders to our preconceived ideas about mad African despots. The dictator lives in a palace while his subjects starve. He surrounds himself with fawning servants who tell him what he wants to hear. Denying reality, he blames everyone but himself. His demeanour is chilling, and fear underpins his dealings with others. His mood changes abruptly, and he is prone to eccentric behaviour, sentimental displays, and fondly recalling the good old days.

What distinguishes classic studies of tyranny - Tacitus' The Annals of Imperial Rome, Trevor-Roper's The Last Days of Hitler - is that the writers "get beneath the skin" of the despot, his henchmen and their servants. They elucidate the conditions in which tyranny arises and the structures that sustain it. Holland has written a book about Mugabe - Dinner with Mugabe. If the BBC profile is a shop front display for the book then I don't think I'll bother going inside.

An Armchair Warrior Girds His Loins

Armchair warrior Bret Stevens is urging the west to invade Zimbabwe (h/t Glamdring):

"A solution for Zimbabwe's crisis isn't hard to come by: Someone – ideally the British – must remove Mr. Mugabe by force, install Mr. Tsvangirai as president, arm his supporters, prevent any rampages, and leave."

Roger that. It sounds so simple, like invading Iraq in 2003.

There are obvious reasons why western military intervention is not on the cards. Western countries have no vital interests at stake. US and British forces are already stretched in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. An intervention force would have to fight the Zimbabwean army and Zanu-PF militias - the degree, duration and effectiveness of resistance are open questions. And invading Zimbabwe would play into Mugabe's hands: the tyrant's hollow rhetoric about western imperialists and their lackeys might become a potent rallying call.

Crying havoc is the armchair warrior's fatuous response to international crises. So fatuous, in this case, that I suspect Stevens' motive lies elsewhere, like trying to justify President Bush's decision to invade Iraq ("the Bush doctrine") and helping him salvage something of his reputation.

But getting back to Zimbabwe - what will make a difference is convincing Zimbabwe's neighbours, especially South Africa, who keep Mugabe in power, that it's in their interests to remove him and his henchmen, peacefully or by force. Make this decision easy by agreeing to provide them with financial and military support to engineer Mugabe's fall, and agreeing to bankroll Zimbabwe's rebuilding. 

Combine this with targeted and ratcheting pressure against Mugabe and his ruling elite - like the freezing of assets, bans on travel, denial of legitimacy, and psychological intimidation - and you have the making of an effective strategy to end Mugabe's tyranny.

A World Cup of Peace

In the 2006 Football World Cup, Germany, France, Italy and Portugal reached the semi-finals, with Italy narrowly beating France 5-3 in a penalty shoot-out to clinch the cup.

But what if the World Cup was about peace, not football? Then New Zealand and the Scandanavian countries would have semi-final berths, with Iceland pipping Denmark to win. According to the Global Peace Index, the world's most peaceful places in 2008 are:

1. Iceland
2. Denmark
3. Norway
4. New Zealand

No prizes for guessing that Iraq gets the wooden spoon.

The Fall Guy

Looks like British mercenary Simon Mann has decided to come clean, with a vengeance. According to David Pallister, who is covering Mann's trial in Equatorial Guinea, Mann is revealing the detail of the 2004 operation which aimed to overthrow the regime of this oil rich country. He's made sensational claims about who backed the coup attempt.

Mann alleges that Mark Thatcher, son of Baroness Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister, was "part of the management team"; that the Spanish and South African governments gave the green light to the operation; and that the Pentagon, the CIA and big US oil companies gave "tacit approval for regime change".

What's been clear all along is that Mann has taken the rap while powerful backers have largely remained in the shadows. This trial will be fascinating to watch - for what it reveals about the people involved and their grubby interests, and about how mercenary ventures are organized, financed, and executed.

"I do believe he will not complain."

Very nice. The International Peace Operations Association is holding its 2008 annual "summit" at this plush hotel in Washington DC. The summit's theme is "Engaging AFRICOM", which no doubt means corporate mercenaries hooking into fat US government contracts in Africa.

British mercenary Simon Mann won't be on the invite list. After spending four years in a Zimbabwe jail, Mann is about to be tried in Equatorial Guinea for plotting to overthrow the government in 2004. And as a failed soldier of fortune, Mann isn't exactly a shining role model for corporate mercenaries.

It wasn't always so. In the 1990s, Mann, a former British army officer, was a poster boy for modern day condottieri. He co-founded Executive Outcomes, the African mercenary outfit which set the standard for private military companies. Later, with Tim Spicer, he established Sandline International, which had mixed success.

Spicer subsequently made good with his new firm, Aegis, which is heavily involved in Iraq. But Mann looks set for a long stint in the grim Black Beach prison. This is a far cry from The Liaison Capitol Hill, where IPOA members will soon be sipping martinis. I doubt that Mann was reassured when Equatorial Guinea's President Obiang recently said of Black Beach, "If he has to spend time there I do believe he will not complain".

AFRICOM and Corporate Mercenaries

Adam at On Political Risk has written about the link between AFRICOM (the US military's Africa Command) and corporate mercenaries:

"AFRICOM, in the Bush administration’s conception at least, is intricately tied to private militaries.  James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner were the first to posit the idea of a central Africa command to Bush, and private contractors were part of the pitch (naturally)."

In keeping with the times, it seems that corporate mercenaries have their own lobbying association and annual conference. Adam's skirmish with the president of the International Peace Operations Association makes for amusing reading. 

Time Up On the Clock?

R W Johnson writes here about Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, and the stolen election. This is an excellent essay at a number of levels, but it is especially valuable for revealing how South African President Thabo Mbeki - "Mugabe's most loyal supporter" - conspired to keep the despot in power.

Johnson believes that Mugabe's time is almost up, but that his fall could be accompanied by a "final paroxysm of terror":

"...by June inflation in Zimbabwe will reach 500,000 per cent. All normal life will become impossible sometime before then. Mugabe's rule can continue so long as there are well-armed and well-paid men willing to protect him, but we are now close to the Papa Doc model and rule by the Tonton Macoute."

>> "Ripe for Revolt?"

Alms for Zimbabwe

What does Zimbabwe desperately need right now?

Food - to feed starving people? Foreign investment - to kick-start the moribund economy and give people jobs? Diplomatic pressure - to force the tyrant Robert Mugabe to release election results and rein in his Zanu-PF thugs?

None of the above according to Beijing. A Chinese cargo ship, carrying 77 tonnes of freight, has docked in Durban. No alms in this cargo, just arms, including:

• 3.5 million rounds of assault rifle and small arms ammunition;

• 1500 40mm rockets;

• 2500 mortar shells (60mm and 81mm); and

• 93 cases of mortar tubes.

According to China's Foreign Ministry, this is part of Beijing's "prudent and responsible attitude towards arms sales".

A High Stakes Game

Is this the beginning of the end of President Robert Mugabe's long reign? Or are things still up for grabs? Chris McGreal reports from Harare on the tense negotiations between the opposition MDC, the ruling Zanu-PF, and army commanders:

"Mugabe's aides have told Zimbabwe's opposition leaders that he is prepared to give up power in return for guarantees, including immunity from prosecution for past crimes....

[According to an MDC official] senior Zanu-PF officials are attempting to pressure the opposition with the threat of a run-off presidential election by ensuring Tsvangirai's proportion of the vote falls below 50% and then delaying the second round.

...the ruling party is threatening to postpone it for three months during which Mugabe's term in office would expire and he would extend his rule by emergency decree.

The MDC's leadership has also opened direct talks with the "top, top" of the army according to the source. The source said that the military leadership is looking for "guarantees for their conditions of service" and to keep farms confiscated from whites provided they are productive."

Yesterday's police raids on MDC offices and foreign journalists could well be ploys in this high stakes game.

>> "Ripe for Revolt?"