The Strategist

Caught my eye - oil's violent twilight and the world's worst goalie

Here are some articles and posts that caught my eye over the last week or so...

• The Oil Drum reviews Peter Maass's new book, Crude World: The Violent Twilight of Oil. Think I'll add this to my reading list.

• Jeff Vail continues a series on "the diagonal economy" with a post on the impact of energy descent.

• In the Gulf of Aden, a boarding party from Australian frigate HMAS Toowoomba captures a boatload of Somali pirates and their guns. The German and Japanese navies help out too.

• Here's one for fans of the beautiful game: what happens when the world's worst striker meets the world's worst goalie? Via Pure Game.

• Finally, here's a great shot of Sydney's red dust storm (Wednesday), taken by Ian Sand...

Tom Barnett and "goofy strategic paranoia"

American strategist Tom Barnett thinks that Australia’s Defence White Paper is “a true work of goofy strategic paranoia”.  He’s perplexed by Canberra’s “recent mental shift” and “sudden fear-mongering”...

...read the rest of this post at Global Dashboard, where I'm guest blogging in June.

New Zealand getting left behind

Tucked away on pages 97-98 of the Australian Defence White Paper is this observation about future New Zealand - Australia defence relations:

"It is therefore critical that our two defence forces maximise interoperability and align our operational planning, logistics, communications, capability development and procurement activities to the maximum extent practicable.

As the ADF incorporates new systems and capabilities, maintaining the current level of interoperability between our separate defence forces will require a concerted effort on the part of both countries. With this in mind, Australia and New Zealand should look for opportunities to rebuild our historical capacity to integrate Australian and New Zealand force elements in the Anzac tradition."

This is a wordy way of saying that Canberra is worried that the small and rundown New Zealand Defence Force will not be able to keep up with Australia's "Force 2030", regardless of Wellington's talk about closer collaboration.

If I was an Australian defence planner, I'd be worried that the New Zealand government:

• lacks a clear and realistic appreciation of the risky strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region;

• believes that New Zealand is shielded from Asian turbulence by oceanic distance, and therefore doesn't need to worry about defence;

• can't take care of security in its own patch (the Tasman Sea, the Southern Ocean and Polynesia); and
  

• is more interested in flogging selling off defence land and equipment, than in thinking hard about the country's security needs for the next 30 years.

"We will fight them in the maritime approaches"

Here's what I found interesting in the Australian Defence White Paper...

The paper, which looks out to 2030 and beyond, takes as its start point the idea that Australia faces an uncertain and risky strategic situation in the Asia Pacific region. This situation is characterized by China's rise as a great power, capable of projecting military force over long distances, the reaction of other Asian powers to China's rise, and the relative decline of US power in the region.

Canberra considers that Australia has to be ready to fight high-tech conventional warfare against modern Asian militaries. It will also have to intervene in "intra-state conflicts" in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, and contend with a range of "non-state actors" (i.e., insurgents, terrorists and the like).

Australia's most vital strategic interest is defending itself against direct armed attack (whether conventional or unconventional). The primary task of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is to deter and defeat such attacks in the maritime approaches to Australia.

In this, Australia has to be able to go it alone. An ADF with "balanced capabilities" is required. That said, there's a big emphasis in the paper on enhancing maritime capabilities, with the ADF becoming "more potent" in undersea warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface maritime warfare. In particular, Canberra intends to expand the submarine fleet, replacing its six Collins-class boats with 12 new submarines.

Also emphasized are enhanced capabilities in strategic strike (Canberra will buy 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and sea-based land-attack cruise missiles), intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (including the acquisition of a satellite with remote-sensing ability), and cyber-warfare.

Canberra's defence white paper a problem for Wellington

Australian army signaller, Dili, East Timor (photo: David Axe).

On Saturday the Australian government released a defence white paper. Here's initial comment by Canberra defence analyst Professor Hugh White.

White criticizes the white paper's emphasis on the Australian navy and airforce...

"Meanwhile the army has been overlooked. This white paper sensibly rejects the idea that military priorities should swing sharply towards the land forces needed for stabilisation and peacekeeping operations. But it goes too far the other way and risks leaving the army too small to fill the tasks expected of it in places such as East Timor and Papua New Guinea."

If this is the case - and I'll have to take White's word for it, as I haven't read the white paper yet - this should be of concern to the New Zealand government. Why? Because if the Australian army is stretched in dealing with unrest in the South Pacific, Australia will look to New Zealand to shoulder an increasing share of the burden.

This is a problem for New Zealand, given the rundown state of our small defence force, its scatter-shot deployment from East Timor to Afghanistan, and limited mobility. Let's hope that our recently announced defence review carefully considers this matter.

Europe - a rising power in Asia?

Europe as a great power player in 21st century Eurasia? That's the intriguing topic of an academic paper by James Rogers entitled "From Suez to Shanghai: the European Union and Eurasian maritime security"*.

Why intriguing? Because it's not everyday that you hear someone calling for an assertive European presence in Asia. And for a person like me, who lives in the Asia-Pacific and who has spent a fair amount of time analyzing the region's strategic situation, it's interesting to view the region through the eyes of someone who is European and who takes Europe's emerging "global power" status as an article of faith.

James argues that Europe should "develop and pursue a far more assertive and integrated grand strategy" in Eurasia, especially in the littoral zone stretching from the Suez Canal to Shanghai and Korea. Why? Primarily to safeguard the flow of European trade and raw materials along the sea lanes that traverse this zone, but also to prevent any one Asian great power dominating Eurasia. How? Through enhanced "partnerships" with rising Eurasian powers, especially India, also Israel, Oman, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and others. And with modernized European maritime forces that can pack a punch deep in the Eurasian littoral zone.

This sounds fine in theory. But there's a number of reasons why I don't see it happening:

• If Europe is emerging as a great power, it's as a continental great power, not a maritime power. The EU is dominated by two countries, Germany and France, who historically looked inland, to Eastern Europe and Russia. This is the dominant European strategic outlook, and it will prove difficult to shift. Those European powers that historically looked to the sea - Britain, Portugal, Holland - have long left behind their maritime ambitions.

• For the foreseeable future the EU has pressing concerns in and around Europe - a resurgent Russia; an uncertain energy supply; political instability in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, North Africa and the Levant; anarchy in sub-Saharan Africa; and a rising tide of refugees trying to enter Europe.

• There's little reason for Europe to commit maritime forces to protect Asian sea lanes when other powers, like the US, India, Australia and Japan, are prepared to do the heavy lifting. The EU is having trouble sorting out its act in Afghanistan, a small and relatively contained theatre of war. How would it go sustaining a long-term and costly commitment in Asian seas of the kind that James envisages?

• European intrusion into Eurasia, a region with a mix of longstanding and rising great powers, would exacerbate, not moderate, tensions. A strategic partnership with India, which James advocates, would heighten Beijing's fears that China is being slowly strangled by a coalition of hostile powers.  

For these reasons, an assertive Europe in Asia is about as likely as Indian warships patrolling the North Sea, and China forming a "strategic partnership" with Turkey.

More Submarines for Australia's Fleet?

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has proposed that Australia's force structure should shift "away from major surface vessels as the major naval capability and towards a larger fleet of submarines that have anti-shipping and land strike capabilities" (h/t Eddie).

Australia already operates six Collins class submarines. The ASPI considers that Australia needs an enhanced capability to strike long-range targets. It considers that the proliferation of submarines in the Asia-Pacific, the use of supersonic sea-skimming missiles by China, India and Russia, and future deployments of terminally-guided ballistic missiles, threatens the survivability of surface naval vessels.

Time for a Laugh

After those heated discussions about Hadrian and Iraq, not to mention Jeff's attempt to counsel me ("Kotare - this whole post just doesn’t seem like you. You're usually more circumspect"), it's time for a laugh.

And what better people to have a laugh at than Australians. Here's a clip of Kiwi comedians Bret and Jermaine (Flight of the Conchords) being mistaken for Aussies in New York (h/t The Interpreter).

"The New Zealand Invasion"

It seems that the Australians will stop at nothing to get another public holiday: "So this Saturday we're going to war with New Zealand. It'll be over by lunch time..." (h/t Andrew D).

"100% Ours for the Taking"

Know of a small, beautiful and undefended country that is ripe for the taking? Seems like the Aussies do...Et tu, Brute?

(H/T Julia.)

Gurkhas of the South Pacific

It's well known that the British army has its own foreign legion in the form of the Gurkhas - Nepalese soldiers who have fought for the British since the early 19th century. At present, around 3500 Nepalese serve in the Brigade of Gurkhas.

What's less known is that over 2000 Fijians are also serving in the British army (h/t Glamdring). The British like the Fijians because they are good soldiers and provide manpower for understrength infantry battalions. The Fijians are lured by good wages and steady jobs. In the Royal Regiment of Scotland, almost one soldier in ten is Fijian, and several Fijians have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recently, the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that the Australian army could also recruit Pacific Islanders for service in the 'Arc of Instability'. The Interpreter took issue with this, partly on the basis that hiring large numbers of Fijian soldiers could compromise Australian army operations if it had to "deploy to Fiji".

This is a good point, but there's a more important issue at stake. Since 1987, Fiji has experienced three military coups and a great deal of unrest (including another coup, and a mutiny). The country is presently ruled by a military strongman, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Having large numbers of ex-mercenaries hanging about, whether British or Australian-trained, plus serving and former members of the Fiji Military Forces, does not augur well for future stability.

Rule the Waves

Paul Easton recently speculated in the Dominion Post that New Zealand's underwater territory is on the verge of "lucratively" expanding. This follows a UN ruling that Australia can extend its underwater jurisdiction by 2.5 million square kilometres. NZ has a similar claim, covering 1.7 million square kilometres of seabed. Hopes are high that this claim will also get the nod.

That's great, I thought, as I read this, but there's no point in having extra territory if we can't police it. The 21st century is a time of burgeoning populations, increasingly scarce land, water, minerals and food, and heightened competition and conflict between nation-states and other groups for control of resources. New Zealand's rich waters, and those of our neighbours - Australia and Pacific island countries - offer tempting prospects to outsiders. We need to ensure that outsiders don't illegally or unsustainably exploit the resources of our maritime region. But our defence force is ill-equipped to deal with such threats.

In the article, Easton quotes Peter Cozens, the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University, as saying that "New Zealand would have to ensure that the new resources were not exploited". I was intrigued by this comment, and emailed Mr Cozens asking for clarification: "Did you mean...that New Zealand would need to invest in additional defence capabilities (such as maritime patrol and surveillance) to make sure that it could control any extended seabed territory?"

Trouble on the Kokoda Trail

Recent protest on the Kokoda Trail (photo: Glen Campbell).

Mines in Melanesia often spell trouble. In Papua New Guinea, where the minerals sector is dominated by Australian corporates, disputes between local landowners and miners are commonplace.

The worst conflict occurred on Bougainville. In 1989, mining at Panguna fused with land rights protests and secessionist politics to spark an ugly civil war that lasted for a decade. Trouble also occurred at Ok Tedi and Porgera, large mines in PNG's interior.

Fresh controversy

An Australian company's plan to mine gold and copper on the Kokoda Trail is causing fresh controversy. Local landowners recently blockaded the trail, stopping trekkers from walking the route, but not for the usual reasons.

Cocaine Colony

The Observer explains how Colombian drug cartels have colonized the West African country of Guinea-Bissau, turning it into a transit hub for cocaine shipments from Latin America to Europe:

"the target of the South American traffickers have been the 'failed states' along the Gold Coast, where poverty is extreme, where society has been ravaged by war and the institutions of state can be easily bought off - so that instead of enforcement, there is collusion. And no more so than Guinea-Bissau, whose weakness makes it a drug trafficker's dream."

Asian and African traffickers are also using Guinea-Bissau, to ship heroin in the opposite direction, from Southeast Asia to the United States.

This suggests that the tyranny of distance does not apply to the narcotics trade, because vast profits outweigh increased shipment costs. For New Zealand and Australia, it highlights the vulnerability of unstable Pacific countries, like Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and East Timor, to the big money of international traffickers.

But the main lesson I drew from this article is that drug cartels don't necessarily need failed states as transit hubs. An isolated province within a relatively stable and prosperous country could serve equally well.

"Dreamers of the Day": Ted Serong

After reading "Who and Where are Today's Military Thinkers?", Exkiwiforces drew my attention to Australian Brigadier Ted Serong, a noted Cold War counterinsurgency and jungle warfare expert.

Described as a "quiet, deep thinker, brilliant tactician", Ted Serong worked in South Vietnam from 1962 to 1975. Initially in command of Australian army military advisers ('The Team'), and advising the commanders of the US Military Assistance Command, Serong later worked as a civilian adviser to the CIA and the Saigon government.

The First Line of Defence

Cynthia Banham reports (h/t The Interpreter) that the Australian government intends reaching out to Islamic migrant communities as a key counter-terrorism measure:

"The Government will consider putting more resources into building relationships with vulnerable local communities rather than solely pumping more funds into intelligence agencies.

This would echo the British approach, which emphasises grassroots social policy such as building community networks, tackling alienation among young people, and encouraging moderate Muslim preachers.

The consensus in the intelligence world suggests the greater threat to Australia is from home-grown terrorism rather than foreigners."

This approach to combating terrorism is imaginative and counter-intuitive. Here's why:

The Green Police

Sea Shepherd Paul Watson.

As Australian politicians wring their hands over Japanese whaling, "Captain" Paul Watson of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society and his ship Steve Irwin are heading for Antarctic waters to take the fight to the whalers. Does this foreshadow a future role for environmental activist groups as "green police"?   

"I will lift up mine eyes"

For those who want to know more about Australia's new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, here's an interesting profile (written by Andrew West) of Rudd's Christian beliefs:

"[Archbishop] Philip Aspinall, suggests that Rudd may have found intellectual freedom in Anglicanism, with its three pillars of scripture, reason and tradition, and a history of accommodating Catholic and evangelical styles of worship. It offered, perhaps, some wiggle room."

The article discusses the duty of Christian political leaders. Aspinall comments that "leaders have to stand up for truth and what's right, and that sometimes involves rough and tumble with vested interests who stand to lose something."

This is an intriguing, albeit rather unworldly, observation in two respects. Firstly, because political power in western democracies usually involves some degree of accommodation, sometimes collusion, with powerful vested interests. Secondly, because political efforts to deal with the big issues that confront human security - climate change, environmental devastation, global oil depletion, and endemic conflict - are stymied by elites that have strong financial incentives to maintain the status quo.

A case in point is the well-documented campaign run by fossil fuel and automotive corporations (especially ExxonMobil) to sabotage international efforts to fight climate change. Their tactics involve trying to discredit the science that supports these efforts, paying people to confuse the debate with junk science and misleading claims, and downplaying the seriousness of the situation. They also bankroll compliant politicians who can be counted on to do their bidding.

I've read enough about Rudd to believe that he is principled and well-intentioned. But the nature of modern politics is such that well-intentioned leaders with a Christian vocation struggle to make headway against the money men who put profits ahead of humanity and the biosphere. 

As Interesting as Carpet?

Someone once described Kevin Rudd as "about as interesting as carpet". It was a remarkably shallow characterization of a man who has led the Labor Party to a landslide victory in Australia's federal election.

Rudd, who defeated John Howard (conservative prime minister since 1996), is bespectacled and bookish - on the campaign trail he claimed to be reading a biography of Thomas Jefferson and a book about Benjamin Franklin's time as ambassador to the court of Louis XVI. Like Tony Blair, Rudd is a conservative Christian; unlike Blair, an Anglican who has moved steadily towards Rome, Rudd was baptised a Roman Catholic but worships at an Anglican church.

As a former diplomat and senior state government official, Rudd has great experience of politics and policy-making, both internationally (he served in Stockholm and Beijing) and at federal and state levels. He comes across more as an efficient manager than an inspiring leader, but one who is determined to call the shots in Cabinet rather than be neutered by Labor Party factionalism. Rudd has a clinical manner, but relates easily to people from all walks of life, as The Bulletin's Chris Hammer noted recently:

"Traipse through enough shopping malls with him, witness him listening intently to the opinions of the politically uninformed, and you begin to sense that maybe he enjoys it, that in some way he gains some insights from it."

The Oil Drum Goes Down Under

The Oil Drum, an authoritative website about energy and peak oil, has recently gone 'down under'. Its Antipodean site, The Oil Drum: Australia/New Zealand, focuses on energy, transport and a sustainable future.

As I suggested in an earlier post, don't rely on governments or oil companies to tell you about peak oil, the maximum limit of world oil production which many experts consider has already occurred or will occur soon. The New Zealand Government, for instance, recently released a policy document entitled "New Zealand Energy Strategy to 2050: Powering Our Future". As set out in the strategy, the Government's view on peak oil is essentially "move along, move along, nothing to see here":

"So while there will, at some point, be peak 'cheap' oil from conventional sources, the world has plentiful sources of fossil-based oil." (NZES page 47).

Read about peak oil and other energy matters here at The Oil Drum: Australia/New Zealand.

Kevin Rudd and the 'Arc of Instability'

Australian troops and police in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.

In a recent speech on Australia's national security policy, Australian Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd made several interesting observations about Australia's strategic situation in the 'Arc of Instability'. This is the island chain to Australia's north - its 'immediate neighbourhood' - stretching from Indonesia through New Guinea to the islands of Melanesia.

Rudd painted a bleak future for the Arc - a zone of failed or failing states, corrupt governments, political and ethnic violence, poverty and pandemics. He identified the situations in East Timor, Solomon Islands and Fiji as precarious:

Fiji is of major concern given unresolved political tensions, the disposition of the police and the armed forces, and the relative density of the urban population.

In Rudd's view, Australia's strategic interests in the Arc have "deteriorated sharply over the last decade", with the prospect of more failed states and a strategic vacuum filled by outside powers. Unless something is done urgently, the cost to Australia will be high - in dollars (the cost of military interventions and humanitarian assistance), public health risks, and waves of refugees. 

This is an attempt by Rudd to paint the Coalition government as crisis-driven - responding to Pacific instability with a 'send in the troops' knee-jerk reaction. But it also reflects a view that unrest is a symptom of a deep-seated malaise in Pacific societies. States 'fail' because they are poorly governed by corrupt politicians. Disorder occurs because there is no 'economic growth' that provides people with jobs and prospects.

Seen from this perspective, sending in troops is like sticking a band-aid on a weeping wound. In a crisis, soldiers temporarily restore order but cannot address the underlying problems. As Professor High White, head of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, recently commented:

Australia hasn't yet found what else you send apart from the army to try and address those deeper political, social, economic problems that are the real root of the issue.

Rudd's answer, announced in the speech, is a 'Pacific Partnership for Development and Security'. This is a genuinely big idea, which would involve a large and long-term Australian commitment to rebuild the "economic and social infrastructure" of Pacific countries and address the root causes of instability.

It's also an interesting idea, because it echoes the findings of a recent British study of the Northern Ireland conflict. As I noted in 'Counterinsurgency lessons from Northern Ireland', the study suggests that there

is a need to identify situations which could lead to insurgency or civil war, and take "early, substantive, visible" action to address root political, social, economic and religious problems.

Would the 'Pacific Partnership for Development and Security' work? I'll analyse this question in a subsequent post.

The Fighter's Guard: Australia and the 'Arc of Instability'

Back so soon? Australian troops patrolling in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006.

It's easy to understand why Canberra worries about the island arc to Australia's north - Indonesia, New Guinea, and Melanesia. In 1942 the Japanese thrust deep into the Southwest Pacific, threatening to invade Australia from island bases. Allied victories at the Kokoda Trail, Guadalcanal and Midway averted the threat. But Australians remember the close call, and this is reflected in their approach to defence.

Australia's defence policy is based on several key principles:

• alliance with the United States, but stand alone if necessary;

• defence of the mainland, and domination of Australia's air/sea approaches;

• attacking hostile forces as far away as practicable.

To do this, Australia needs high-tech air and naval forces with a qualitative edge over regional forces. It must also exert strategic influence over the island arc, to prevent hostile powers establishing a presence. For Australia, the island arc is like a fighter's guard - get inside the guard and the fighter becomes unbalanced and exposed.

The problem for Canberra is that in recent times the arc has become unstable, with failed states, corrupt governments, violence, poverty and environmental degradation. Indonesia is struggling with Islamic extremism, and Melanesia is plagued by political and ethnic conflict. In the 1990s the phrase 'Arc of Instability' was coined. As Australian Labor leader Kevin Rudd recently commented, it has "gone from being a strategic concept a decade ago to an unsettling reality today".

Instability raises the prospect of rising regional powers, such as China, gaining footholds close to Australia. It is not difficult to imagine a failing state seeking financial assistance from Beijing, and providing basing rights in return. For Canberra, China's rise, and the perceived erosion of Australian influence in the Arc as Pacific states 'look north', are of growing concern.

There are more immediate worries. Canberra perceives that the Arc is becoming a haven for terrorists, drug traffickers, people smugglers and criminal financiers. These elements are attracted by growing lawlessness, corruption, and proximity to Australia. Conflict and economic collapse could trigger refugee waves, and require Australian intervention to evacuate nationals and provide humanitarian aid.

Nightmare scenarios include a fragmenting Indonesia, and the collapse of Papua New Guinea (PNG), a former Australian colony. With substantial security, economic and consular interests in PNG, Canberra would feel obliged to take control of the country. This would be an enormous drain on finances and manpower, and would expose Australian personnel to great risk.

Recognizing the high stakes involved, Canberra provides PNG with substantial financial support, and assists other governments with reforms. Since 1997 Australia has led a number of regional interventions in response to crises - notably East Timor and Solomon Islands.

There is currently a debate in Canberra about whether Australia should be more proactive in addressing the economic and social roots of instability - more 'fences at the top of the cliff'. Invariably, this would involve greater cost and intrusion into Pacific sovereignty. One thing is certain - Canberra sees a bleak future for the Arc of Instability, and is resigned to further intervention.

(This post is part of the Oceania series collaboration between Coming Anarchy, The Strategist, and Pacific Empire.)   

Following in the Footsteps of Xerxes?

High five! Labor leader Kevin Rudd on the campaign trail.

Politicians tend to exaggerate, especially when they are running for office. Kevin Rudd is no exception. Rudd is the leader of the Australian Labor Party. He is challenging Prime Minister John Howard at this year's Australian federal election.

In a recent speech on national security policy, Rudd commented that one strategic consequence of the Iraq debacle is the "empowerment of Iran":

"After two and a half thousand years it takes genuine strategic policy talent to succeed in rehabilitating the Persian empire. Iran is now casting a longer shadow over the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East."

Now Rudd is no fool when it comes to foreign policy and history. He is a former diplomat who served in Stockholm and Beijing, has a degree in Asian studies (Chinese history and language), and speaks Chinese fluently. And it's commendable that a politician brings a historical perspective to policy making.

But it seems a little overstated for Rudd to compare the empire of Darius and Xerxes, which at its glorious height stretched from the Indus River to the Hellespont, with the ramshackle Iranian regime of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Fanning the Embers: China and Instability in Oceania

Razed buildings in Honiara, Solomon Islands, April 2006 (photo: Nick Reese/AP).

Much of the debate about China's rise in Oceania focuses on strategic considerations. Will Oceania become an arena of strategic competition between the US and China? How will China's rise affect the interests of longstanding Pacific players, such as the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan?

But what about the impact on Pacific islands themselves? Beijing's engagement, and the activities of migrant Chinese, is exacerbating poor governance and corruption, fanning the embers of instability, and depleting natural resources.

Exacerbating poor governance and corruption

Most Pacific islanders live in villages, close to the land and the sea, or retain ties to village life. They are resilient and able to cope with hard times. But their governments are often fragile and characterized by poor governance and corruption.

Lavish aid, provided by China and Taiwan as part of their diplomatic rivalry, exacerbates these problems. Aid money is siphoned by corrupt politicians and officials. It perpetuates reliance on outsiders. The 'no strings attached' nature of the aid undermines domestic and international efforts to promote effective administration.

Fanning instability

The China-Taiwan rivalry is also playing out in domestic politics, with Beijing and Taipei bribing and bankrolling politicians. Consequently, politics in some countries are becoming more corrupt. After the April 2006 elections in Solomon Islands, politicians were bribed to support pro-Taiwan or pro-China camps. Rioting in Honiara was partly sparked by popular anger about politicians being bought by Asian money.

The influx of Chinese migrants to Oceania is feeding instability. Chinese increasingly dominate the business sector, and this is resented by locals. During unrest in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006, Chinese businesses were targeted by looters. The situation was particularly serious in Honiara, where the Chinatown was razed and Chinese residents fled the country. And Triads have infiltrated Pacific capitals, trading in drugs, weapons and people, and using the islands as transhipment points to Auckland, Sydney, Los Angeles and Vancouver.

Depleting natural resources

Pacific governments have an abysmal record of protecting their natural resources - principally timber, fisheries, and minerals. Typically, weak governments allow foreign companies to pillage resources, in the process destroying forests and polluting waterways and seas.

China is engaged in a global search for natural resources, and this encompasses Oceania. A Chinese corporation is building a large nickel mine in Papua New Guinea (possibly the first of a number), and Chinese fishing fleets are hammering the Pacific's fisheries. Unless checked, China's activities will further deplete Oceania's resources, degrade the environment, and deprive Pacific islanders of their livelihood.

Unintended consequences?

China's military involvement in Oceania has so far been low key. This could change quickly. One scenario could be that Beijing dispatches troops to protect Chinese nationals caught up in civil unrest. And, as I noted in Dark Side of Paradise, large mines are a major source of conflict in Melanesia. Threats to Chinese mining operations from landowners could see Beijing deploy soldiers as 'security guards', or provide Pacific armies with 'military advisers'. The instability that Beijing is fanning could inadvertently trigger Chinese military intervention.

[This post is the latest in a series on Oceania's security challenges. Coming Anarchy is hosting the series, and Phil Howison at Pacific Empire is also contributing. See here or here for the posts so far.]

Transnational Crime and Street Gangs in Oceania

Phil Howison writes about organized crime in Oceania here at Coming Anarchy.

"Home-grown street gangs are a growing threat to Oceania’s island states. In addition, criminal organizations from around the world have taken advantage of the economic vulnerability and weakness of the Pacific islands, using them as bases for money laundering, drug smuggling, illegal immigration and other nefarious activities." 

The Long Game: China's Rise in Oceania

Rolling out the red carpet: China's President Hu Jintao greets PNG Prime Minister Michael Somare, 2004.

Oceania is often seen as a strategic backwater, isolated from the whirlpool of great power politics. This is far from true. In the 19th century, Western powers carved up Oceania's islands. In World War Two and the Cold War, American preponderance in the Pacific was challenged, unsuccessfully, by Japan and the Soviet Union. For well over a century, Oceania has generally been a Western lake.

Rising Asian powers, in particular China, are now quietly contesting the West's stranglehold. Over the past decade Beijing has boosted its regional profile and presence. This is visible in new embassies, lavish aid and loan packages, high profile political visits, red carpet treatment for Pacific leaders, and substantial commercial investment. This comes at a juncture when US interest in Oceania has waned, and Britain, a former colonial power, has left the region.

There are a number of reasons for Beijing's interest in Oceania:

• Political machinations: China seeks to counter Taiwanese influence. Six Pacific states recognize Taiwan; the rest recognize China. Beijing wants to keep its allies onside and persuade the others to leave Taiwan's camp. As inducements, Beijing spends lavishly on aid programmes, and provides soft loans and debt write-offs for struggling Pacific states.

• Raw materials: China needs oil, minerals and timber to fuel its burgeoning economy. East Timor and Papua New Guinea (PNG) have significant oil and gas deposits, while Melanesia is rich in minerals and timber. China has invested heavily in PNG's mining, timber and fishing sectors. It has carried out extensive oceanographic research in Oceania - this includes surveying seabed minerals and fish stocks. Large Chinese fishing fleets exploit deep sea fisheries.

• Migrants: Beijing has consular responsibility for Chinese people who have recently migrated to Oceania. Migrant Chinese dominate the small business sector in island capitals. In PNG, Chinese businessmen have become influential in the mining and timber industries. Migrants provide Beijing with useful intelligence and links to local politicians and officials.

• Military threats: China keeps a watchful eye on US military movements in Micronesia. If China attacked Taiwan, Guam would be a key staging post for US forces moving to assist Taipei. Until recently the Chinese military maintained a base on Tarawa (Beijing closed the base when Kiribati recognized Taiwan). This base was part of China's space warfare programme, and spied on the US missile testing range at Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands).

China's engagement has troubling implications for Pacific island states, and for New Zealand and Australia, which I will explore in a later post. It may also presage a wider Chinese ambition, one in which Oceania forms the outer zone of a Chinese sphere of influence.

One trend is evident. The increasing presence of China, and Japan, Korea and Taiwan, reflects a gradual shift from a Western dominated Pacific order to a more complex situation in which rising North Asian powers challenge the dominance and comfortable assumptions of the traditional players. 

[This post is the latest in a series on Oceania's security challenges. Coming Anarchy is hosting the series, and Phil Howison at Pacific Empire is also contributing. See here or here for the posts so far. Photo: Xinhua.]

The Arc of Instability

The Oceania series continues at Coming Anarchy, with Phil Howison posting here about the 'Arc of Instability' and 'Africanization of the South Pacific':

'"Arc of Instability" and "Africanisation" are both important in understanding security concerns in the Pacific.  They have inspired several interventions by Australia and New Zealand, and are reflected in aid and assistance packages.  While this has resulted in accusations of "neo-colonialism" and "imperialism," most Pacific states admit that there is a need for international involvement to prevent conflict...'

[Photo: BBC: a burning hotel in Honiara, Solomon Islands, during the April 2006 riots.]

The Regions of Oceania

Phil Howison of Pacific Empire has written the second guest post in the series on Oceania's security challenges here at Coming Anarchy.

In his post Phil defines the three sub-regions of Oceania - Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia - and highlights some of the big issues, including great power rivalry:

The geo-strategic environment has heated up...as Western dominance is challenged by aggressive Chinese diplomacy. Meanwhile, Australia and New Zealand are increasingly concerned with maintaining security in their Pacific backyard, fearing an influx of refugees, transnational crime and even terrorism from the “arc of instability”.

Do We Need Leaders Who Are Sunny Optimists?

Kevin Rudd is leading the Australian Labor Party into the 2007 federal election. Yesterday Rudd gave a speech to the party's national conference. Wearing thick glasses, and bearing an uncanny resemblance to a youthful Mao Zedong, Rudd rallied the party faithful, with 'embracing the future' his catch-cry.

Rudd's address was unremarkable. He spoke calmly and confidently. The speech was cohesive, but was long and appeared to have been worked up by a high school debating team. Key challenges were highlighted: 'long term energy security', climate change and its impact on water, food and national security, and the rise of China, India and militant Islam. But the speech lacked detail about the nature of these challenges and how to overcome them. It was heavy on references to a glorious (Labor) past, and full of cliches and empty phrases. On past threats to Australia, Rudd said that "we came through because we looked the future squarely in the eyes and responded to the challenges". On the environment, Rudd said that Labor believes "in the sustainability of this marvellous planet, the Earth itself".

I've been mulling over Rudd's speech, in particular the following remark:

"I am an unabashed optimist when it comes to our country's long term future. I see opportunities everywhere."

In a dangerous world do we want political leaders who are sunny optimists, like Rudd? Or do we need political leaders who are realists?

Optimists see the positive in everything. They reassure us that it's all good, and that we can go on living like there's no tomorrow. They see the best in people, even tyrants and dictators. They believe that we can invent our way out of any jam. Got a problem with climate change? The optimist will reassure us that we will invent space mirrors that reflect sunlight away from our "marvellous planet". Got a problem with oil running out? The optimist will say that it's really a question of 'long term energy security', and anyway we can invent cool hybrid cars.

Realists, on the other hand, try and see the world as it really is. They are alert to danger, both now and in the future. They do not attempt to curry favour, or treat us as imbeciles. Instead they confront us with the hard facts: that we must act to deal with present troubles and forestall future ones, and that action will involve hardship and sacrifice, not pipe dreams. Realists take a pragmatic view of human nature, knowing that men are good and evil, selfless and greedy. They understand the wisdom of Machiavelli's remark, that unarmed prophets come to grief in a dangerous world.

This century we face myriad dangers: from climate change, resource wars and peak oil to global terrorism, habitat destruction and aggressive great powers. We need political leaders who are realists. Leaders who are street-wise and worldly. Leaders who tell it like it is, not pull the wool over our eyes. Leaders who treat us as responsible citizens, not as children seeking reassurance. Unfortunately, men and women of such calibre seem few and far between.

Anzac Day

They shall grow not old, as we that are left grow old

Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn.

At the going down of the sun and in the morning

We will remember them.

               - Laurence Binyon, 'For the Fallen'

                  

Snapshots #2

Just what the **** is 4GW? Are you bewildered by military technobabble like 'core-gap', '4GW', 'open-source warfare' and 'COIN'? ZenPundit is blogging a series explaining cutting edge military theories. The first two posts are here and here. 

Australia moves to militarise Antarctica: Don't be fooled by Stuff's catchy but sloppy headline. An Aussie polar war-fighting capability has only been suggested by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

War in America: Simulated Laughter draws a link between the US approach to the insurgency in Iraq, and how US law enforcement agencies police tough inner-city American neighbourhoods.

On the rhizome theory of guerilla war: Jon Stewart interviews British General Sir Rupert Smith, author of The Utility of Force (from ZenPundit). Here and here are the links to the video clip (which is in two parts).

Now, how do you apply for this cushy number? Britain's Ministry of Defence has a bunch of guys - officially they're called the 'Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre' - who get paid to navel-gaze about this sort of stuff all day long.

A Hedgehog Strategy Favours Small Countries: Part 2

Machiavelli: "The main foundations of every state are good laws and good arms." (The Prince, XII)

In my earlier post on a 'hedgehog' defence strategy, I argued that the Iraqi insurgency suggests an approach that small countries could use to defend themselves against larger enemies. The received wisdom is that a country needs a well-equipped 'all-arms' defence force. But for small countries maintaining such a force is impractical. It's also risky because a small force will quickly be overwhelmed by a larger one, and because it plays to the enemy's strengths in conventional ('industrial') warfare.

One alternative is to have a 'niche' force with a selection of capabilities matched to short and medium-term needs. This is also risky because it leaves a country ill-prepared to defend itself in a major conflict.

A better option may be for a defence force to consist, at least in part, of small, highly trained guerrilla units armed with low tech weapons: surface-to-air missiles, explosives and anti-tank weapons. In an invasion these units would attack an occupier's weak points, e.g., headquarters, lines of communications, supply units, civilian administrators. The primary aim would be deterrence: convince a potential enemy that the cost of invading outweighs the benefit.

"This is a hedgehog strategy: most dogs leave hedgehogs alone, knowing that if they bite they'll get a whole lot of pain and nothing to show for it."

I've received some interesting feedback, and this has given me food for thought. For example, Dave wrote that:

"The prerequisite for arming the citizenry is that they are united in their allegiance, quite homogeneous, and that your crime rate is low. The existence of an underclass makes that impossible?"

And geniusNZ observed that the "problem with this strategy is that it relies on the fact that the enemy cares for you or...is fundamentally overstretching itself."

I'm working on another post which develops the hedgehog strategy idea. This will include considering how a small country could achieve strategic depth with a long-range deterrent (the capability to strike at the enemy's homeland) and a stand-off deterrent (the capability to do damage to an approaching enemy). My argument focuses on New Zealand's defence situation, but it may be applicable to other countries.

Meanwhile, here is a scenario to ponder...

The year is 1992. Saddam Hussein is licking his wounds after his army was routed in Kuwait. Fearing that the US may return to finish the job, Saddam thinks about how to defend his regime. He comes up with two options:

• Option A: go conventional. Rebuild the army. Buy more tanks, artillery and planes to make up for those destroyed. Conscript more young men to make up for those lost. Appoint more relatives to command positions. Dispatch the army to guard Iraq's borders.

          Or

• Option B: go feral. Disband the army. Sell off surviving tanks, artillery and planes. Create a decentralized network of guerrilla units, embedded in local communities. Arm the guerrillas with surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles, explosives, and AK-47s. Task them to attack an invading enemy's vulnerable points. Forget about borders.

Saddam chooses option B.

Fast forward to 2002. Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld are pondering an invasion of Iraq. Advisors paint a grim picture. An attack will be successful, they say, but only because there will be nothing to attack. No armoured divisions to steamroller; no infantry formations to pulverize; no headquarters and communications links to knock out. It will be a cakewalk but...

The trouble will come later when US forces are enscounced in Mesopotamian cities. Saddam's guerrilla units will emerge from hiding to attack US soldiers at times and places of their choosing. Helicopters, transport planes, trucks and soft-skinned vehicles will be destroyed by IEDs, rocket launchers, and hand-held surface to air missiles. The guerrillas will target commanders, their staffs and rear echelon troops: truck drivers, signallers, doctors, nurses, chief cooks and bottle washers. Casualties will be high, and US troops will become embroiled in a confused, shifting and demoralizing fight against a faceless enemy.

All this gives Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld considerable food for thought...

(Read A Hedgehog Strategy Part 3.)

Are the Aussies Fighting a Thinking Man's War?

War makes for strange bedfellows. As Paul McGeough writes in the Sydney Morning Herald, the Australians and Dutch are running a reconstruction programme in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan. It is part of a counterinsurgency strategy which prioritizes winning hearts and minds above winning the fight against the Taliban.

"We are kicking the Taliban where it hurts," says the Aussie commander. "We're winning the support of the people and it's the most important thing we can take from the Taliban, and we're not going to do it by focusing on an enemy - we must focus on the people."

The Dutch and the Australians seem to have taken a leaf out of British General Sir Rupert Smith's book, The Utility of Force. As I noted in an earlier post, Smith says that capturing 'the will of the people' as a crucial objective, but considers that most western armies relegate hearts and minds to "a supporting activity to the [military] defeat of the insurgents rather than the overall objective". This certainly appears to be the case elsewhere in Afghanistan.

McGeough's article makes a number of other intriguing observations. These include:

• that other NATO contingents have criticized the Dutch and the Aussies for 'cosying up to' the insurgents and shirking the fighting;
• that the Taliban have not attacked the reconstruction projects: this is put down to the insurgents not wanting to alienate the local people who support the work;
• that there may be informal dialogue between the Dutch/Australians and local Taliban.

When we don't understand a group of people, we label them inscrutable and see the group's leaders and members as being of one mind. But it is likely that the Taliban has its fair share of egomaniacs and control freaks, and is divided by feuds, petty jealousies and conflicting ambitions. If Uruzgan insurgents can be drawn into dialogue, perhaps as a prelude to detaching them from the Taliban and bringing them into a legitimate political process, then so much the better.

The Dutch/Australian approach will be judged on its results. In the interim it seems like a subtle and sensible plan. It is certainly different from time honoured approaches - trying to take down the Taliban, for instance, or spraying opium crops with herbicide - which only fan the flames.

Take the Long Way Home

I was at the office today playing around with...oops...working with Google Maps on the internet. I printed a street map of a small town, then a map of the highway between that town and another, then peered at a satellite image of my house. Some odd white blobs in the backyard unsettled me momentarily, but I came away thinking what a wonderful product Google Maps is.   

That is until I read this article in the Sydney Morning Herald. The article says that Google's new Australian mapping service (which claims to offer directions between any two addresses) suggested that to get from 200 Sussex St to 201 Sussex St in Sydney one would need to travel 10.4 km and cross the Sydney Harbour bridge twice. Normally it's a 30 second walk across the street.

I imagine that taxi drivers will think this a marvellous invention, but for the moment I'll stick with a boring old road map.

Ending our Oil Fix

Eliminating New Zealand's dependence on foreign oil is not airy fairy, tree hugging nonsense. It is cold hard calculation about our future security and prosperity...

In my recent post China's Unquenchable Thirst for Oil I argued that conflict between China and the US over the world's dwindling oil reserves is inevitable. Heavily dependent on foreign oil, NZ stands to lose badly. We must eliminate our dangerous oil addiction and our vulnerability to external forces - by drastically cutting oil consumption, boosting renewable energy, conserving energy and using it efficiently.   

Here are some things that government has to do:

• get people out of cars, by boosting public transport and walking/cycling infrastructure, and bringing in congestion charging;
• reinvigorate our railways, thus slashing the tonnage of goods hauled long distance by trucks;
• complete rail electrification, allowing goods trains to be hauled by electric locomotives;
• conserve energy, by adopting new energy efficiency technologies and conservation measures;
• provide financial incentives to encourage households, farms, businesses and hospitals to generate their own power, e.g., through solar hot water heating, fuel cells.

Sorting out our energy supply will play a major part in ensuring NZ's long-term independence, security and prosperity. It will also have other major benefits, such as cutting the cost of energy to consumers, meeting NZ's Kyoto commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improving urban air quality, and boosting community resilience in time of disasters and war.   

Reform on this scale appears daunting. But the Australian government is showing the way. Responding to Australia's water crisis, Prime Minister John Howard yesterday announced a water management strategy (worth AUS $10 billion) that is full of hard-hitting measures. These include federal control of the Murray Darling river basin, addressing the over-allocation of water entitlements, and modernising irrigation infrastructure to reduce water wastage.

For New Zealand, one lesson is that bold and farsighted reform can be achieved, even in the face of opposition from vested interests and knockers. Another is that we should not wait for the crisis to hit, but must act now to avoid it.