The Strategist

"Cohorts of War" - a general framework

In war, the crucial element is people: how they are organized for combat, what holds them together as a fighting force, what society do they spring from. How they fight, and what they fight with, are secondary. The Roman army was arguably the world's greatest army because of the calibre of its men, the way they were organized, and the strength of the society from which they came. Not because it had better swords and shields.

Last week I started to model the development of western military organizations since the Renaissance, using the "Generations of Warfare" idea as a starting point (here and here). Since then, I've refined and expanded the model.

Firstly, I've decided to use "cohort" instead of generation, and to call my framework "Cohorts of War". I don't like the term generation because it suggests a historical progression - an evolution of military organization from primitive to sophisticated - which is often not the case. So, it's gone.

The Oxford English Dictionary defines cohort as...

1. an ancient Roman military unit
2. a band of warriors
3. persons banded or grouped together, esp. in a common cause.
   

This fits pretty well with what I'm trying to describe: the fundamental types of military organization throughout history. I've also...

• added a generation cohort - there are now five.

• extended the framework beyond Europe and the last 500 years.

• associated the generations cohorts with themes, and illustrated them with examples, rather than link them to specific time periods and places. If you look at Lind's original Generations concept, one of its methodological weaknesses is that by linking generations to time and place, contradictions and exceptions mount to the point where it loses integrity as an analytical framework.

So, here are my five cohorts of war (CW). This is a work in progress, and I welcome suggestions, questions, qualifications and criticism.

Simon Mann, mercenary - the movie

Sounds like mercenary Simon Mann wasn't treated too harshly during his 15 months jail time in Equatorial Guinea's notorious Black Beach prison...

"Mann has said he 'felt like a guest … and not like a prisoner ... and there were reports he dined on wine, chicken, steak and vegetables brought in from a nearby restaurant."

"He had his own cell, exercise machine and books and was allowed regular calls home. He often had lunch with ... the Security Minister, who would bring food and wine from his hotel..."

I can't wait to see the movie. But they're gonna have to jazz it up a bit. Actually, a lot. Eating steak, sipping wine and reading Dumas's The Count of Monte Cristo just won't cut it.

So, here's a couple of ideas for enhancing the plot...

Early on, prison thugs try to make Mann their bitch. He fights back with improvised weapons. That's where the steak knives and wine glasses come in handy. Along the way, Mann uses his accountancy skills to expose the money swindling scheme of the prison governor.

Later, Mann hatches a daring escape plan. It involves a wooden horse, tunnelling under the wire, and a motorbike jump to freedom. The prisoners break out but after a gunfight are recaptured. They're about to be shot when the presidential pardon comes through.

Still feels light, though. Any more ideas?

Mercenary dealt a get out of jail card

What skulduggery went on behind the scenes to secure mercenary Simon Mann's release?

Mann has been freed from a jail in Equatorial Guinea, one year into a 34 year prison sentence. Last year he was jailed for masterminding, if that's the right word, a failed coup d'état in the oil-rich West African state. Think Frederick Forsyth's The Dogs of War, minus the altruistic motives and sound planning and execution.

I wonder how long it is before the exclusive article, book and movie come out? These should give Mann some recompense for languishing for five years in African jails, and missing out on his fee for the coup, rumoured to be £10m plus double the expenses.

Fighting piracy: private security companies in the Gulf of Aden

Note: I'm researching companies that provide ship owners and marine insurers with security, crisis management and legal services to help them deal with the Somali piracy threat.

On Thursday I wrote about private security companies (PSCs) doing anti-piracy work off the Horn of Africa. What services do these companies provide to ship owners?

• Shipboard security: small teams, usually three to six people, deploy to vessels for the duration of transits. Some board and disembark from Yemen ports. Others work longer transits, from Suez, Mombasa, Dar-es-Salaam, Durban, the UAE and Galle, Sri Lanka. This gives teams more time to get familiar with the ship, its crew and routines, and work out how to secure it. GoAGT charges US$35,000 for a transit through Yemen waters.

• Escorts through high risk waters: PVI has its own escort vessel. MAST advertises that it can charter ex-military patrol craft to escort super yachts. GEO/Shield, GoAGT and Muse utilize Yemen navy or coastguard vessels. GoAGT advertises that "a heavily armoured 37.5m Austral patrol boat" will accompany a ship (cost: US $45-55K). On the other hand, ISSG does not provide escorts: a company executive told me that "we feel that the only way to properly defend a vessel is from the vessel itself".

• Information and advice: companies provide ship owners and masters with voyage risk assessments and intelligence updates, advice on route planning and onboard security, crew training, and 24 hour monitoring during transits. Drum Cussac, for instance, will monitor a ship's progress and advise the master on changing threat levels. Muse utilize the services of an anti-piracy centre run by the Yemen government.
  

Security teams primarily seek to detect and deter pirates. "A properly and visibly secured vessel will likely be passed on by the pirates," a Gulf of Aden contractor told me. "They prefer a ship they can take quickly, without too much trouble". With approximately 200 ships transiting the Gulf of Aden daily, the pirates have many ships to choose from.

If deterrence doesn't work, security teams will try to make boarding difficult and dangerous for pirates. One way of doing this is having the ship change direction sharply so that the wash capsizes pirate boats. As a last resort, teams will try to stop pirates boarding and gaining access to the ship's superstructure, e.g., by using acoustic devices and high pressure firehoses.

Most security is non-lethal. Some companies, like REDfour, MAST and Muse Pro Group will provide armed guards, but this depends on the flags of the vessels. Other companies, like Drum-Cussac, equip their teams with non-lethal means of repelling boarders.

According to the Gulf of Aden contractor, companies engage security personnel when needed. They're often British, former special forces and marines. REDfour, for instance, recruit team leaders who've served in the SAS and SBS (Special Boat Service), the elite of British special forces units.

I asked the Gulf of Aden contractor why Brits, rather than say Americans, are used. It comes down to distance and expense, he said. "Teams are flown in from Heathrow to a port to board, and flown home to Heathrow at the end of the job. Flights from the US are too long and expensive".

But some companies look beyond the British armed forces for security personnel. Some US-flagged vessels carry armed American guards. Muse employs former American servicemen - former US Navy SEALS, Special Forces and Delta soldiers. A Muse company executive told me that "time in service, combat experience and training is what we look for. And a good brain". GoAGT uses Yemeni soldiers and coastguards. ISSG recruits former marine commandos from the Indian navy, with a minimum of 15 years military service and mariner qualifications. 

Related posts

> Private security companies called in to combat Somali piracy

> Law firms and Somali piracy

> Insurance for ships in Somali waters

> The profiteers: companies making money from Somali piracy

Insurance for ships in Somali waters

Introductory note: I'm researching companies that are profitting from Somali piracy.

If you're a shipowner and your ships are sailing through the pirate-infested waters of the Horn of Africa, what sort of marine and specialist insurance cover will you be carrying?

• Hull insurance covers the ship, while cargo insurance covers the goods and commodities that the ship carries.

• War risk covers a ship for damage while sailing through a war zone (which Hull doesn't cover). There are two main types: war risk liability, which covers people and items inside the ship, and war risk hull, which covers the ship itself.

• Protection and indemnity ("P&I") insures the shipowner against third party liabilities and expenses that may come from owning or operating ships, e.g., collisions with other ships, claims from injured crew.

• Kidnap and ransom ("K&R") covers the cost of dealing with a pirate hijacking - it indemnifies the assured for ransoms, and pays for crisis response, hostage negotiations, ransom drops, legal advice and so on. Traditional cover meets the price of ransom but not the extra costs - a ransom will be around 25 - 30% of the total cost of dealing with a pirate attack.

Hiscox is a leading K&R insurer. It claims to write about two-thirds of global K&R policies. Hiscox retains private security corporation Control Risks to provide its K&R clients with crisis response services if their ships are hijacked by pirates.

London-based Control Risks was founded in 1975, initially as a subsidiary of an insurance broker. It's one of the world's biggest private security corporations, with maritime security but one of its business activities.

As well as crisis response, which can include negotiating with pirates and ransom drops, Control Risks assesses risk for shipowners and advises on voyage planning and counter-piracy measures. It can provide shipboard security teams and monitoring and operational support while vessels are sailing through pirate waters.

The profiteers: companies making money from Somali piracy

Who are the western companies that are profiting from Somali piracy? And how do they make their money?

I'm researching these questions for an article. So far I've identified an assortment of companies that are engaged in security activities relating to Somali piracy and hostage-taking in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Generally speaking, these companies are involved in one or more of the following activities:

• Security for ships: private security companies, like Hart and Secopex, provide guards and non-lethal weapons on ships, training for crews in piracy countermeasures, and advice to shipowners on operational security and risk management.

• Crisis management: London-based law firms, like Holman Fenwick Willan, coordinate responses to hostage-taking on behalf of shipping clients. They engage specialist companies, such as Control Risks, to manage crises, conduct negotiations with pirates, and carry out ransom drops. Law firms also provide shipowners with legal advice, e.g., on the legality of paying ransoms. 

• Marine insurance: companies like Cooper Gay write kidnap and ransom ("K&R") policies for shippers. Hiscox also provides shippers with crisis management teams. In 2008, Swinglehurst Ltd teamed with Hart to provide shippers with war risk cover (including piracy risks) for vessels protected by Hart personnel transiting the Gulf of Aden.

• Intelligence, analysis and monitoring: companies such as Dryad Maritime Intelligence provide piracy threat assessments to shippers. The ICC International Maritime Bureau runs a 24-hour Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur.

As the maritime capital of the world, London is the hub for most of this activity. Collaboration between companies appears commonplace. Gulf of Aden security work seems to be dominated by British firms, but American companies, like Xe (formerly known as Blackwater) and Hollowpoint, are getting in on the action.

Executive Outcomes founder starts a blog

These days even ex-mercenaries are writing blogs.

In 1989, Eeben Barlow, a former South African special forces officer, founded Executive Outcomes, a mercenary company. Executive Outcomes operated mainly in Africa in the 1990s, fighting in Angola and Sierra Leone. Disbanded in 1998, the company gained a reputation as a highly effective private military force.

Now Barlow is working as a consultant and blogging* about military and security matters. Check out his blog, especially this post which suggests ways that companies can fight criminal gangs that are preying on their activities. (I assume that Barlow is talking about places like South Africa, where crime is rampant and the police are often ineffective and corrupt.)

He has good advice about how companies should handle contracts with security firms:

"Do they usually know anything about the company providing their security? Have they made the security company liable for any burglary, theft or other losses they may suffer while under their watch? Are security companies given a time-line in which to perform adequately and resolve the crime issues within a company?"

Barlow suggests that to combat organized crime, large companies should develop their own in-house intelligence collection and assessment capabilities, and the means to counter criminal activities.

* h/t Zenpundit

"Global Trends 2025" - dog eat dog for control of resources

I continue reading the US National Intelligence Council's "Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed" report, and briefly comment on things that interest me.

Chapter 5 of "Global Trends 2025" discusses the "growing potential for conflict" - insurgencies, civil wars, interstate conflicts - particularly in the greater Middle East. It suggests that states could fight over scarce energy resources. As demand for energy heats up, states will try to lock in unfettered access to oil and minerals...

"this could lead to interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources to be essential to maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime."

We'd be foolish to ignore the possibility of state vs state conflict. But as the report suggests, it's a worst case scenario. I'd suggest that what will happen, in parts of Africa (like Congo and Niger delta), central Asia and Latin America, is violence around oil fields and mines as a byproduct of competition for access by governments, foreign corporations and hybrid corporate-criminal organizations.

How could this play out? Here's some ideas:

• Foreign corporations use proxies ( local militias and paramilitary forces, criminal gangs, private military companies) to protect their interests and destabilize competitors.
  

• Regional power-brokers - warlords, corrupt officials, crime bosses and insurgents - fight for control of resources and trade.
  

• Locals living near oilfields and mines fight back as their lands, forests and rivers are confiscated and devastated.

A final thought. In this dog eat dog world, multi-national corporations will be out-gunned by local warlords and bandits unless they come equipped with their own heavies, or enter business arrangements with said warlords and bandits.

Sea dogs of war

It was only a matter of time before private military companies like Blackwater seized the business opportunities on offer off the coast of Somalia (h/t Tom S)...

"...Blackwater is planning to cash in on the rising threat of piracy on the high seas by launching a flotilla of gunboats for hire by the shipping companies.

The firm, which gained international notoriety when its staff killed civilians in Iraq, has already equipped one vessel, called The McArthur, which will carry up to 40 armed guards and have a landing pad for an attack helicopter.

The McArthur, a former survey ship, arrives in the Gulf of Aden, the scene of the recent high-profile hijackings and shootouts with Somali pirates, at the end of the year. It is to be joined by three or four similar vessels over next year to form the company's private navy."

As long as governments are unwilling or unable to plug this particular hole in the global security system, PMCs will look for a piece of the action. Fundamentally there's little difference between mercenaries riding shotgun on supply convoys in Iraq or on ships sailing through the Gulf of Aden.  

Is Dubai a Strategic Blindspot?

Yesterday a colleague told me about a friend who is working private security in Dubai. The remark was made in passing, and I didn't follow it up, but later I wondered why Dubai? Surely all the private security action is in Iraq?

Then I read Curzon's post at Coming Anarchy, and began to understand...

"But while Western expats flock to the city and skyscrapers reach upwards, locals are becoming increasingly alienated by the foreigners flocking to their homeland and are enjoying precious few benefits from the experience....Ordinary people have no way for their voice to be heard except in the streets and mosques where fury is reportedly growing."

Is this crying wolf? Or are we so fixated on Iraq, Iran and Israel, that Gulf entrepôt like Dubai have become strategic blindspots - places where chaos could erupt swiftly, with adverse consequences for global and regional stability?

Last of the Wild Geese?

A ragtag bunch of mercenaries, a failed coup attempt, a sham trial in a African dictatorship...it was never going to end well for Simon Mann. In 2004 the British mercenary tried to replace President Obiang, the tyrant of oil-rich Equatorial Guinea, with a puppet who would comply with Western corporate interests. Now, Mann has been sentenced to 34 years jail in Malabo's notorious Black Beach prison.

Mann, 56, has already spent time in a Zimbabwe prison: "If I have got to push it I have got to push it," he said. "And at least I know now that I can push it after four years in Zimbabwe".

From the 1960s there's been a colourful tradition of white mercenaries - 'Mad Mike' Hoare, 'Colonel' Bob Denard, Simon Mann - staging coups in ramshackle African countries. Frederick Forsyth even wrote a cracking good novel, The Dogs of War, about a coup d'état in the 'Republic of Zangaro'.

With Mann's incarceration, have we have seen the last of these Wild Geese and their rather amateurish efforts to overthrow African despots? I'm picking that as global competition for dwindling oil supplies heats up, we'll see enterprises that are better organized and financed, led by private military companies which have tacit understandings with western governments and their agents.

The Fall Guy

Looks like British mercenary Simon Mann has decided to come clean, with a vengeance. According to David Pallister, who is covering Mann's trial in Equatorial Guinea, Mann is revealing the detail of the 2004 operation which aimed to overthrow the regime of this oil rich country. He's made sensational claims about who backed the coup attempt.

Mann alleges that Mark Thatcher, son of Baroness Margaret Thatcher, the former British prime minister, was "part of the management team"; that the Spanish and South African governments gave the green light to the operation; and that the Pentagon, the CIA and big US oil companies gave "tacit approval for regime change".

What's been clear all along is that Mann has taken the rap while powerful backers have largely remained in the shadows. This trial will be fascinating to watch - for what it reveals about the people involved and their grubby interests, and about how mercenary ventures are organized, financed, and executed.

"I do believe he will not complain."

Very nice. The International Peace Operations Association is holding its 2008 annual "summit" at this plush hotel in Washington DC. The summit's theme is "Engaging AFRICOM", which no doubt means corporate mercenaries hooking into fat US government contracts in Africa.

British mercenary Simon Mann won't be on the invite list. After spending four years in a Zimbabwe jail, Mann is about to be tried in Equatorial Guinea for plotting to overthrow the government in 2004. And as a failed soldier of fortune, Mann isn't exactly a shining role model for corporate mercenaries.

It wasn't always so. In the 1990s, Mann, a former British army officer, was a poster boy for modern day condottieri. He co-founded Executive Outcomes, the African mercenary outfit which set the standard for private military companies. Later, with Tim Spicer, he established Sandline International, which had mixed success.

Spicer subsequently made good with his new firm, Aegis, which is heavily involved in Iraq. But Mann looks set for a long stint in the grim Black Beach prison. This is a far cry from The Liaison Capitol Hill, where IPOA members will soon be sipping martinis. I doubt that Mann was reassured when Equatorial Guinea's President Obiang recently said of Black Beach, "If he has to spend time there I do believe he will not complain".

AFRICOM and Corporate Mercenaries

Adam at On Political Risk has written about the link between AFRICOM (the US military's Africa Command) and corporate mercenaries:

"AFRICOM, in the Bush administration’s conception at least, is intricately tied to private militaries.  James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner were the first to posit the idea of a central Africa command to Bush, and private contractors were part of the pitch (naturally)."

In keeping with the times, it seems that corporate mercenaries have their own lobbying association and annual conference. Adam's skirmish with the president of the International Peace Operations Association makes for amusing reading. 

Raiders of the Lost Archives: "A Knight's Tale"

Every weekend I ransack the lost archives of The Strategist, to recall what I posted a year ago to the day (or thereabouts).

On 12th June 2007 I reviewed Frances Stonor Saunders' biography of Sir John Hawkwood, the 14th century condottieri:

"Hawkwood was an English knight who fought with Edward III and the Black Prince at the Battles of Crecy and Poitiers during the early period of the Hundred Years War. After the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360, Hawkwood gathered together a company of English men-at-arms and bowmen and went to Italy to ply his trade.

In subsequent decades, Hawkwood and his merry men rampaged around Italy, fought under numerous banners (Pisa, Milan, Florence, Padua, the Papacy), and extorted enormous sums in ransom and protection money from city-states. Pillaging, looting, killing and strong-arm tactics was their stock in trade."

There's a striking parallel between medieval Europe, where mercenaries were routinely hired by rulers and city-states, and the present day, where so-called private military companies, such as Blackwater and Aegis, do much of the dirty work for western governments in Iraq and Africa.

Hawkwood was a forerunner of today's corporate mercenaries - a calculating, cold-hearted and flinty man with an excellent eye for "business" opportunities.

Gurkhas of the South Pacific

It's well known that the British army has its own foreign legion in the form of the Gurkhas - Nepalese soldiers who have fought for the British since the early 19th century. At present, around 3500 Nepalese serve in the Brigade of Gurkhas.

What's less known is that over 2000 Fijians are also serving in the British army (h/t Glamdring). The British like the Fijians because they are good soldiers and provide manpower for understrength infantry battalions. The Fijians are lured by good wages and steady jobs. In the Royal Regiment of Scotland, almost one soldier in ten is Fijian, and several Fijians have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Recently, the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that the Australian army could also recruit Pacific Islanders for service in the 'Arc of Instability'. The Interpreter took issue with this, partly on the basis that hiring large numbers of Fijian soldiers could compromise Australian army operations if it had to "deploy to Fiji".

This is a good point, but there's a more important issue at stake. Since 1987, Fiji has experienced three military coups and a great deal of unrest (including another coup, and a mutiny). The country is presently ruled by a military strongman, Commodore Frank Bainimarama. Having large numbers of ex-mercenaries hanging about, whether British or Australian-trained, plus serving and former members of the Fiji Military Forces, does not augur well for future stability.

Spreading the Word

Here's three posts that I've enjoyed reading recently.

Crossed Crocodiles writes here about the operations of private military companies (mercenaries) in Africa and their links with the US's AFRICOM command. (By the way, AFRICOM now has its own 'blog', but like Evolution of Security, which I wrote about here, it largely appears to be a PR bullshit exercise.)

The Yorkshire Ranter is skeptical about American efforts to persuade European NATO countries to dispatch troops to fight in Afghanistan. He also observes that the British are trying to set up something like the Firqat irregular units used in Dhofar (Oman) in the 1970s.

Curzon at Coming Anarchy has been mapping the waxing and waning of Persia, from the Achaemenid Empire in 500 BC to the modern day. This is the latest post in a Coming Anarchy series that has also covered Ethiopia, Poland and Armenia.

Time Travel

In this article, Tom Robbins describes how he flew from Heathrow to Muscat for a weekend break in Oman's fabled Empty Quarter. The luxury holiday included "giant 4x4s painted a sexy military matt beige", mobile safari camps ("people rush out and present us with cold towels and drinks"), and a British tour leader who moonlights as a mercenary in the Sultan of Oman's army.

It occurred to me that this could be the future of travel - rich Westerners paying lots of money to spend time in very isolated parts of the globe, guided and guarded by private military companies who come equipped with high tech weaponry, solar powered applicances, and all terrain vehicles.

On an overcrowded, clamorous and polluted planet, the wealthy will pay for privileged access to quiet, unspoilt and untroubled wildernesses, as far from the violent unwashed as possible. They will fly in private jets direct from walled western enclaves to distant retreats, shunning the world's megacities, which threaten deadly diseases, car bombings, and kidnappings. Expect the Empty Quarter, Kamchatka and the atolls of Kiribati to come into their own as travel destinations.

As for the rest of us - well, forget about backpacking on the cheap. The collapse of centralized authority, the rise of warlords, and endemic conflict and banditry, will make much of the Third World a "no go" area. Soaring oil prices and carbon charges will make air travel a distant memory of the golden age of cheap and plentiful oil. As it has been for most of recorded history, travel will be done by soldiers, sailors, merchants and migrants, as a matter of livelihood not leisure.

(Photo: The Guardian.)

Guns for Hire

Several years ago I led a security operation on a large hill country farm. A radical group, who claimed sovereignty over the land, were targeting the station and its owner. They cut fences, tried to drive stock off the property, threatened farm workers, and occupied buildings.

My main resource, to counter these activities, was a group of security officers. These men were drawn from a large private security company which was contracting to the farm owner. They were a mixed bag. Two men, who I used as team leaders, were good - ex-servicemen, mature, smart and tough. The others were of a lesser quality, and several were useless.

The company's managers were amateurs, nice enough but clueless. The regional office was a slovenly shoebox. No-one had thought to provide the guys on the ground with basic equipment, like off-road vehicles, binoculars, and wet weather gear. I improvised, for instance equipping the team with quad bikes and 4WDs from the farm.

This experience coloured my view of private security. It is partly why I am skeptical about the idea that private companies should take over policing and community protection. Neoliberals argue that policing should be privatized, to make it more 'efficient'. And some futurists predict that as nations fragment, weak governments will not be able to protect communities from hungry hordes and criminal gangs. Communities, particularly the rich, will barricade themselves in walled fortresses and hire private firms to protect them.

I don't care what the global rich do with their money. And I have no problem with businesses hiring private security to protect their premises, as long as they act lawfully.What concerns me is that ordinary citizens might be led to believe that they can protect themselves only by employing hired guns.

Machiavelli, in The Art of War, highlighted the danger when a community outsources its security. He referred to 15th century Milan, an Italian city-state, which hired mercenary Francesco Sforza to protect it.

Sforza, in order to support himself in splendour and magnificence in peacetime, not only betrayed the Milanese who employed him in their service, but also deprived them of their liberties and made himself their sovereign.

In The Prince Machiavelli explained that the Swiss cantons and German city-states were free because they banded together to defend themselves:

The cities of Germany are wholly independent, they control only limited territory, and obey the emperor only when they want to....The Swiss are strongly armed and completely free.

I recently discussed some features of a resilient community - a community that is organized first and foremost on a principle of self-reliance. In normal times, a resilient community contributes to its own security, working with law enforcement agencies. In an emergency, when outside help may not readily be available, it protects itself. In a follow-up post I'll explain how a community might provide its own security.

A Knight's Tale

Mercenaries featured prominently in Italian politics and warfare during the 14th century. Organizing themselves in 'free companies' of freebooting warriors, they hired themselves to princes, popes and city-states - whoever paid the most, and paid on time, for their military services.

In Hawkwood: Diabolical Englishman (2005), Frances Stonor Saunders writes about Sir John Hawkwood, one of the most famous, notorious and successful mercenary commanders (condottieri). Hawkwood was an English knight who fought with Edward III and the Black Prince at the Battles of Crecy and Poitiers during the early period of the Hundred Years War. After the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360, Hawkwood gathered together a company of English men-at-arms and bowmen and went to Italy to ply his trade.

In subsequent decades, Hawkwood and his merry men rampaged around Italy, fought under numerous banners (Pisa, Milan, Florence, Padua, the Papacy), and extorted enormous sums of ransom and protection money from city-states. Pillaging, looting, killing, and strong arm tactics was their stock in trade.

For a biographer it's crucial that the subject leaves records of his life - diaries, letters, accounts - or that family, friends and acquaintances do so. This allows writer and reader to find out what made the man tick. Without recourse to such records, the biographer has to imagine what the subject thought about things, or spill a lot of ink putting the subject's life into context.

Stonor Saunders does the latter superbly well, chronicling the brutal politics of 14th century Italy, and conveying what life was for ordinary folk. In short, life was damned unpleasant, as people battled to survive the Black Plague, interminable warfare, famines, rapacious rulers, and robber barons like Hawkwood and other condottieri. 

Hawkwood did not subscribe to the view that the pen is mightier than the sword. He was a man of action, not words, and did not leave personal records for posterity. It's clear, reading the book, that Hawkwood was not someone you would wish to meet if you were a rich merchant travelling between Pisa and Milan. He was a clever, cold-hearted and flinty killer. Unfortunately, the dearth of personal records leaves Stonor Saunders struggling to convey a deeper sense of the man himself. At the end of the book, Hawkwood, for me, remained a distant figure.    

Big Boys' Rules

British mercenary Simon Mann liked to play at big boys' games. He now has to accept big boys' rules.

'Posh Spice': The Reinvention of Tim Spicer

Tim Spicer doesn't like being labelled a mercenary or hired gun, according to former CIA officer Robert Baer. Tim is a respectable businessman who owns Aegis Defence Services Ltd, a 'security and risk management' company. Aegis has a plush London office and a fancy website with photos of kids, gleaming buildings, an oil derrick and a busy port. Not many photos of men with guns. Think Posh Spice, not Old Spice.

Sandline crisis

Old Spice was one of the leading protagonists in Papua New Guinea's Sandline crisis. In 1997 the PNG government hired Spicer to put together a private military force that would recapture Bougainville's derelict Panguna copper mine from rebels. Spicer brought in Executive Outcomes, a notorious African mercenary company, to spearhead the assault. But Spicer and his men were arrested by the PNG army commander, Brigadier-General Jerry Singirok, who then staged a coup for good measure. After a show trial, Spicer was kicked out of the country - an ignominious retreat for the former Scots Guards officer.

Having closely watched Old Spice's antics at the time, I've never had a high opinion of him. Spicer went to PNG knowing little about the country, barely containing his disdain for 'the natives' and their lazy way of doing things. He failed to grasp the explosive politics, rivalries and vendettas that underlay the Bougainville issue, and he was slow to realize that the ground was shifting beneath him. Ultimately he was outsmarted by the wily Singirok.

But for all his faults, Old Spice was fun in a shady kind of way. He seemed to be a bumbling throwback to the larger than life characters that dominated the African mercenary scene in the 1960s - 'Mad Mike' Hoare, Jean 'Black Jack' Schramme, and Bob Denard.

Spicer's return

Posh Spice, the reinvented Tim Spicer, doesn't sound like much fun. Baer notes that in the last few years Spicer has made good: in 2004 Aegis won a US$293 million contract to coordinate the activities of private military contractors in Iraq. In the process Spicer has become stinking rich, semi-respectable and grimly efficient. He's also a poseur who likes to imagine himself as a cross between T E Lawrence, Dr David Livingstone, Hugh Hefner and 007 - "driving an Aston Martin, dating beautiful woman, and living in a mansion in South London". (Ironically, his old nemesis, Jerry Singirok, is running a taxi company in Port Moresby.)

The really interesting thing about Spicer is not the man himself, but what he and his company represent. Mercenaries appear to be on the cusp of achieving a level of respectability that they have rarely enjoyed. The use of mercenaries in war is an ancient phenomenon, and until the rise of the nation state mercenaries were a staple element in warfare. Mercenaries were often professional and hardy, and came well-equipped. They formed the backbone of many armies and royal bodyguards, and provided specialist skills that might not otherwise be available. Despite their usefulness mercenaries have always been tarred with a bad reputation.

Machiavelli was particularly critical, describing mercenaries as useless, untrustworthy and dangerous. This judgment was partly based on his observation of 16th century Italian mercenaries and analysis of the use of mercenaries in antiquity. Crucially it followed from Machiavelli's view of the relationship between the state, military power, and freedom: that a primary foundation of a free state is good arms ("the Swiss are extremely well armed and are completely free"); that states should look to their own resources to defend themselves rather than rely on outsiders; and that a ruler's first duty is to master the profession of war, even in peacetime.

The corporatising of conflict

These arguments are as compelling now as they were in Renaissance Italy. But today the use of mercenaries appears to be shifting. Mercenaries are more likely to be used for security or training in the world's trouble spots (notably Iraq) than fighting in armies. They are more likely to be employed by private corporations (oil and mining companies) and international organizations (the UN and aid agencies) than governments. This reflects the exploitation of the world's resources by transnational corporations, and resistance by local people. And like everything else in our free market system, conflict is becoming corporatized. Tim Spicer and his kind are just another class of business entrepreneurs.

The pros and cons of using private military companies in international settings - peacekeeping missions for example - have been debated extensively. One possible 'con' that has escaped attention is 'backfire' - mercenaries returning to their homelands and putting their skills to nefarious uses. Phil at Pacific Empire has written about this in relation to Iraq and Fijian mercenaries: 

"Mercenaries make up the second largest foreign force in Iraq, and they will be going home sometime in the near future. What happens then for many of the contractors, especially from poorer countries like Fiji? Prices will drop, and some of those mercenaries will want to create their own work, and start their own groups."

This point is well made. But what about western countries, and what of the future? The power of the nation state is fragmenting, and many areas resemble the violent, poor, anarchic and polluted regions of the third world. Seeking security, but lacking confidence in police, and not having the expertise or fortitude to defend themselves, wealthy individuals and communities could increasingly turn to private companies to protect them.

The high medieval period in Europe could be a historical parallel. This was a time of warring empires, principalities and city states; of brutal politics and power struggles between church and state, nobles and kings, people and tyrants; and of bloody expeditions against infidels in distant lands. Power was often fragmented, with walled cities, powerful nobles and bankers paying lip service, at best, to notions of fealty to emperors and kings.

In Italy, mercenary companies dominated warfare, with condottieri (mercenary commanders) contracting their services to city states like Florence, whose merchants and bankers wanted security from rapacious princes and popes. The most able condottieri were good commanders and astute businessmen, and often exercised considerable power.

Condottieri

Tim Spicer reminds me not of Lawrence of Arabia or James Bond, but of medieval condottieri like Sir John Hawkwood and Francesco Sforza. The danger is that Spicer and others will regard instability in the west as a business opportunity in much the same way as they now see the situation in Iraq. Their roughshod practices in Iraq will inform how they operate back at home.

The rich customers of private military companies may think they are getting a good deal - protected by ex-special forces types with armoured cars, helicopters and surveillance gear. But how free is an unarmed man when he pays an armed man to provide him with security?